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Introduction 
On October 2 , 1 990 the artificial se para t ion of the Ge rman 
state, in place since 1945, officially c ame t o an en d . The s y mboli c 
finale, of co urse , took place n ear l y a year earlier with the 
spo ntaneo11s breaching of the Berlin Wal l . The sudden p ro tests that 
b rought down the Berlin Wall and the Commu nist governments of 
Easter n Europe took the West by surprise, as did the speed of 
German reunification . The reunifi cation of Germany, in addition t o 
the Soviet wi thdrawal from the rest of Eas ter n Europe has brought 
an e nd to the bipolar division of Europe t h at had been i n place 
si n ce 1945 . 
Great joy has resulted among the peoples of Germa n y and t h e 
rest of Eastern Europe . Questions and concerns have also b e e n 
raised. The re moval of Sov i et control has left a powe r vacuum 1n 
Easte rn Europe . Al though the Soviet presenc e and i n fluence in 
Eastern Europe was uniforml y reviled b y those states, the USSR did 
supply them with markets for their goods, inexpensive pet r oleum, 
a nd, for Poland, a guarantee of t he sanctity of t h e Oder-Ne i sse 
li ne. Today , the Warsaw Treaty Or ganizati o n is disbanded a n d 
COM ECON will soon leave the stage. The last Soviet troops 1n 
Eastern Europe, those in the former GDR, are scheduled t o leave in 
1994, their departure financed b y the Germans . Many in Eastern 
Europe are no w asking how this power vacuu m will be fil led. 
Th is is an opportunity for the Germans to fu l fill t he ir 
historic mi ssi on as a " bridge " t o the East. A resur gence of German 
influence is both welcomed a nd viewed with co n cer n in the East . 
• 
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Thei r shat t ered economie s ar e in d i r e need o f Ge rm a n a ssi s tanc e , 
but t he spec te r o f prev i o u s Ger ma n do mi n ation remai n s . 
Thi s p~p e r wi l l l oo k at the h is t o r y of Ger ma n r e l at i o ns wi t h 
t he Ea s t in ~ n atte mpt to gai n i nsig h t in t o the f u tu r e o f Ge r man -
Ea s t E Ll r ope a n r e 1 a t i on s . Ch a n g e a nd c o n t i n u i t y i n Ge r m a n r e l a t 1 o n s 
with t h e Ec1.st f ro m t h e o ri gi n al Ge r ma n c olon iz a t i on of Eas t e t·n 
Eu r o p e d uri n g t he Mi d dle Ages unti l t he p res e nt will be examin e d . 
Spe c ial a ttentio n wi ll be paid t o the histori ca l, g eograph ical, a nd 
e c o n o mic fa c t ors tha t have influenced German behavior. The paper 
will atte mpt to show that the East has alway s held a n a t t raction 
and fas cinat i on for the Germans, an attraction that has often led 
to Ge rman efforts to dominate the region . These effor ts 
c ulm i nated in what was to become World War II . Post-1945 Ge rm a n 
diplomati c relations with the East will also be examined in a n 
ef for t to s how that despite more limited diplomatic options in a 
bipo l ari z ed Europe, the FRG nevertheless maintained an " a f f i n i t y" 
for t he East. Finally, present-day relations, as well as prospects 
for f uture relations between Germany and the East will be e xa mi ne d . 
• 
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Colonization of the East 
rh e foundatio n underlying Ge rman y 's sense of mi ssio n towards 
the East lies i n Germany 's colo ni zatio n of the region whi c h beg an 
nParlv i-l mi lleni.u m ago . Bet \•:ee n the Eleventh Century and 1945, 
Cier man peoples e migrated into today's Poland , Czec ho sl ovakia , 
H11ngary, Ro ma n ia, the Bal tics, and Yugoslavia . 
Ln til the Thirteenth Century German mi gration to the Eas t was 
mini ma l. In fact , t he l inguistic boundar y separating Germans and 
S1Rvs , o r i ginally fo rmed b y t he Elbe and Saale Rivers, had moved 
only sixty mile s Eas t b y the l at e ll OOs . 1. With t he beginning of the 
13th c entury , ho wever, German movement to the East intensified . 
As the Germans mo ved East they co n v erted the pagans t o 
Christianity and assi mi lated the m into their culture . Sometimes the 
Ge rmans a ppeared a s conquerors, as in the case of Brandenburg Ma r k 
in 1035 . Alt hou gh c onquered, the Slavic i nhab itant s were not 
dee ima ted . Ra t he r, the y were simpl y converted and usual 1 y were 
a llowed to re mai n on their land as l ong as the y utilized more 
effici ent German agricultural methods . At this time the land was 
spa rsely populated. The Ge rman settlers merel y t ook o ve r previously 
un used land, or draine d marshes t o create new plots . Over t i me 
Slavs and Germans intermarried and eventually the native 
populations we re absorbed b y Ge rman culture . Even when the Germans 
I 
were i n vited i nto an area, mu ch the same process took place . In the 
' 
' Hermann Sc hreiber . Teuton a nd Slav . ( New Yo rk: Knopf, 1965) , 
62 . 
• 
• 
ear ly 1200s Duke Barnim of Wes t Po mera n i a invi ted German immigrant s 
to set tle the land a s a way of s tren gt hening his Du c hy . . .\s in t h e 
case of Brandenbur g , t h e n ative p op ulat io n \,as eve n t u a 11 ~· 
assi milated and absorbed into Ge rma n c ulture . 
~ationalis m and et hn ic d isl ike between Ge rmanic peop le s and 
Sl avs was not t o rleve l op f o r several more ce n t uries. At this ti me 
the i mportant differenc es between peoples was no t o n e of et hni c it y 
bu t of soci.aL c lass . Thus, assi mil a t i o n was o ft e n unforced and 
u s1 1al 1 ~- wel c o med . 
The Germans broug ht t e c hni c al a nd cultural i nnovatio ns. The y 
introduced the i ro n plough , as well as the ability to drain ma rshes 
a nd build d i kes. German culture in the forms of law, lan guage, 
poetry, and rel igio n were also c onveyed to the nati ve s. Cit ies a nd 
mo nas te r i es sp r a n g up and merchants brought goods fro m the West . 
On e of the most effective means of transplanting German 
c olo n ie s a n d cult ure to the East was via the Teut on ic Knight s . Th e 
Te u tonic Knights were a c rusadi ng order . Although they participa ted 
actively in c rus a des to the Hol y Land , the order did no t a c hie ve 
no t oriety until it·began parti c ipating i n European c rusades i n t h e 
ea rl y 1200s. Around 122 0 King Andrew of Hungary invited the Kn ig h ts 
to ta ke control of Burzenland, part of present-day Transyl v ania , in 
return for defending that area of Hungary's fronti e r aga i nst t h e 
pagan s . The Knight s quickly built fortresses and brought in German 
settlers . Although King Andre w e v entually e x pell ed the Or d er 
• f o llow ing a di s pute , the s ettlers were allowed to r e main . 
This episode in the Balkans, however, was b u t a p re cu r sor f or 
• 
• 
• 
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the Knights' mo st famous c ru s ade: the c onquer ing of Prussia . In 
1224 Duke Conrad of ~las o via i n v it e d the Orde r to Prussi a . Th e 
nati ve P r·11s s ian s we re pagans. Previous c rus ades b y t he ?o l es h a d 
fai~ed , and n o w D11 ke Co nr ad was c oncerned b y a c ivil wa r t .1.king 
p L'lC(' 1n (' raco w. T he Kn ig hts we re b ro11gh t i n not o nl y to h e l p 
co n q11er the pagans o n ce a nd for al l, but a l so t o e na ble the Duke to 
p ;-1 r r i c i pa t e i n t h e c i v i 1 war w i t h o u t fear o f a t tac k f r om t he 
Pc tt ssi ans . 
The Pru s s ians fought hearti l y against the Knights and the 
e a r ly ba ttle s of co nquest, as well as later revolts, largel y 
de c imated t he native population . German settlers were brought in 
and t ho se natives who remained were assimilated into German 
c ul t ure . A Papal Bull of 1234 gave the Order the "sole right to 
make war, make foreign polic y , collect taxes, and exercise hi gh 
,justi c e'' in Prussia. 2 Despite this degree of a utonomy, the Order 
pa i d homage to Polish kings until 1660 when the Treaty of Oliva 
fo rm a ll y t urned over sovereignty of Eastern Prussia to the Great 
Electo r of Brandenburg. 
The Teutonic Knights went on to conqner the Ba l t ic s ·a nd 
establish German settlements . The Order's eastward expansion was 
eventually halted by the Ru ssians, however, who by 1560 had 
succeeded in forcing the Knights fro m the Salties . Neverthe less, 
substantial Ge rman minorities remained. Further German c o l oni zation 
of Eastern Eu rope was facilitated b y Catherine the Great's 
--·----------------
2William Urban. The Prussian Crus ade. (Lanham, Md . Un i ve r·s it y 
Pr e ss of America , 1980), 128. 
• ti 
invitati on to German s ettle r s to move i nt o the Crimea and Volga 
Ri ver regions of Russia, as well as ~aria Theresa's enc o u rage me n t 
of 1;erman settlements in the Balkans. 
The Emergence of Prussia 
Brandenburg - Prussia was the last European state t o develop 
as a so - called "G reat Power" during the E i ghteenth cent ur y . Th e 
Eightee nth and Ni ne teenth Ce n tu rie s were c h a r acterized by 
incessant fig h ting for territory and influenc e in Europe. As o ne 
of t he last p owers to appear on the European st ag e, a nd by virtue 
• o f her central geog r aphic position, Prussia a nd the other s mall 
Ge rman states were often at the merc y of more power ful neighbors. 
In Brandenburg-Prussia's case, Russia a nd a wea k Poland sto o d to 
the East, Au stria t o the South, Sweden to the North, and France 
t o t he West. Te rritorial expansion was thus ess e nt ial for P~ u sia 
• 
to gai n influence in Europe, as well a s to mainta i n independ e nce 
and sovereignty; for onl y through exp a ns ion could economic self-
suff iciency as well as a population larg e e no ug h to suppl y ample 
personnel ~nd revenue to support a larg e army be attained. 
Al thou·gh most of the German state s had been devastated by 
the Thirty Years War, Brandenburg was left i n the enviable 
positio n of making gains following the Treaty of Westphalia in 
lti48. The treaty allowed Brandenburg to add a s ma ll slice of 
E~stern Pomerania to her t e rri tory . Nevert he l ess, in 16-48 
Brande nburg's holdi ngs were greatly s epa r a ted. The most import~nt 
• 
• 
• 
divisio n was between Brandenburg and Prussia. For more than a 
c en t ury rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia would fi g ht to un i te t hese 
t wo a re a s. 
The struggle to joi n these two separated p r o vin c e s p u t 
Pru ss ia i nto c o nf l i c t with mo st of h e r p owe rf ul ne i ~hb o r s a t o n e 
tim e o r anot her . For 60 years a c o mbina t i o n of Sw e dis n st r e ngt h 
in Nort heast Europe and French unwil l ingness to allow 
alt P rations in the status quo created b y Treaty of West p h a lia 
prevented Brandenburg-Prussia from expanding eas tward. However, 
t he Wars of the Spanish Succession served to di mini sh Fre nch 
influence and an alliance with Peter the Great in 1714 against 
Sweden allowed Prussia to take Western Pome ran i a . 3 Pru ssia then 
had cont ro l of the vital Oder Estuary, t hus allowing a c c es s to 
the Bal ti c . The Prussian presence in the East was f ur t he r 
st rengthened by the taking of Silesia f rom Austria during the 
Wars of Austrian Succession. 
Prussia's alliance with Pe te r the Great was the firs t 
political t reaty between Prussia and Russia and as An gela Stent 
points out marked the beginn ing of a relationship that wa s mor e 
of ten friendly than hostile. 4 During this time German ad v isors 
7 
played a major role in Peter's westernization program and Russ i an 
and German nobility intermarried frequently . 
'\ 
' Branden burg-Prussia came to be known s impl y as Pruss ia 
follo wing the coronation of Elector Frederick III of Brandenbur g as 
King Frederi c k I of Prussia in 1701. 
4
.A.ngela Stent. 
{ Wi n ter 90/91): 64 . 
"The One Germany". Foreig n Po li c_y . n o . 81 
• 
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Although the Russ ians under Eli z abet h were a member of the 
allia nce t ha t fought Prussia during the Seve n Years War, i t was 
Rl1ss i a's wi thdrawal from the coalition following Elizabe th's 
death in 1 763 that saved Prussia fro m defeat . Th e war impre s sed 
o n f red e ri c k the Great , who be ga n to fear encircleme nt by the 
o t he r powe r s . Thus , fr o m 176 3 o nw a rd he pursued an allianc e with 
Ru ss ia . Coope ration with Russia was t o be found at the expense of 
the Po l es and wa s embodied in t he partitions of Poland. 
The fi rst pa rtition of Poland, whi c h was dev i sed b y Russia 
and Pru s sia a nd then acceded to b y Au str i a in 177 2 , p r ovided 
Prussia with Ermland, West Prussia and a district of Great Poland 
along the Ne tze. Althoug h both Ermland and West Prussia contained 
German minoritie s from previous s ettlement by the Teutonic 
Knights , only Ermland was successfully assimilated and absorbed 
into Prussia. In West Prussia a strong Polish element remai n ed . 
As natio n al consciousness grew, this element came to s ee the 
Prussian s as opp ressors and resented the importanc e of Germans in 
publi c life . 
In 17 93, Russian and Prussian c ollusion led to a second 
par tition of Po land . Poland was further dismembered b y the two 
po we rs, Prussia taking Danz ig and Thorn in addition to 
territori es around Posen and Kalish which became "South Prussia" . 
The fi na l pa rtition of Poland took place following a revol t by 
t h e Poles . Pru ss ia was given Warsaw and some surrounding 
• t e rritory which became known as "New East Prussia". These 
territori e s were co mpletely Polish i n c haracter. Thus, Poland 
• 
9 
cease d to exist and Ru ssia became Prussia's immed iate neighbor to 
th e Eas t . 
The partiti o ns of Po land se rved to fulfill Pru ss ia ' s ~oa l o f 
un i. tin~ t h e sepa r ated p rovinces o f East Prussia a nd Brandenbur·e: . 
[mma11uel Ge_i. ss stresses t h e si.gnifi can ce o f Pru s sia 's Po li s h 
a c q u i s i t i o n s : ·' The annex at i o n o f Po l i s h t e r r i t o r y had f i n a 11 ~, 
e nd orsed h e r !Prussia's ] c lai m to be a Great Pow e r in Eu r·oi-,e. 
P r1 1s si a 's 'raiso n d'etat' a nd very exi s t ence as a Great Po wer was 
h P n ce based on the posses ion of ... Posnan and \"est Prussia . ·· 5 
Ha.j o Holborn also notes that the par t i t io ns of Poland resulted in 
a P n1ss i a n "depende n ce" on Russ ia that would remain a 
determining facto r i n modern German history for t h e ne xt 
• centur y '' . 6 
• 
Pr u ssian coo peration with Russia co ntinued into the 
Ninetee nth c entu r y . At first Prussia sought to rema i n neutra l 1 n 
Europe's war with Napoleon. However, b y 1806 France had for c ed 
Prussia to sig n treatie s which made Prussia a v irtual French 
ally, a nd put Prussia into conflict with England b y givi n g he r 
con trol of English Hannover. The loss of marit i me trade as a 
result of worsened relations wi th England, combine d with Frenc h 
duplicit y led Prussia to mobil ize agai nst France . 7 
5Ha jo Holborn. A His t or y of 
(Pri n c eto n: Princeto n Universit y P ress, 
n 
Moder n 
1964), 
Ger ma n y 
256-7 . 
164 8 -1 8 40 . 
' During peac e ne g otiations with England Napoleon o ffered the 
return of Hann over t o the Br iti sh without co nsul t ing Prussia. 
Furthermore , large numbe rs of Frenc h tr o ops were poised o n t. h e 
P ru ssian borde r. 
• 
• 
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Wit hout wa it in g for Ru s s i~n a s s i sta nc e t he P ru s s i ans fou gh t 
and we r e c rus h e d by Na po l eo n. \ ap o l e o n wen t on to defeat the 
Ru s s ia r,s A.<s wel l. T h e F r e n c h p r epared to c ar ve u p Pr u s si a . 
Ho we\ e r . whe n \/ a p ole o n a nd Czar Al exa nd e r I met a t T i. ls it in 180 7 
t o , ·oric l11 ,1e ;{ t reat y of pe a c e and all i a n c e Al e x ande r i nsj <-; ted , 
·:i. ~ q I t1 ,-, c \ ·1 p n Leo n ' s w ·j sh es , that P r tt s s 1 a b e p r es e r v e d a s a s t a l e . 
:-.;;3poleo n t' e l ,·~nte d , n eve rt h e Jess , Pr u ss ia l o st h a lf o f h e r 
t e rT il o r·y , i nc lud i n ~ t er r i tor y ta k e n as a re s u l t o f th e fi na l t wo 
p a r· t I t. i o n s o f Po La n d . Th e s e lands we r e us ed to c o nst it u t e a n e w 
du ch y o f ~ar saw. 
Fi ve ye a r s late r Cza rist f orc es c h ased Napol e on o u t o f Russi a . 
P ru s s ia ,j o ine d the Russians in th e fi g h t against Franc e i n the 
Wa r s o f Liberat i o n (181 3 -1 5 ). As Ge i ss a sserts, for the t h ird 
t i me Prussia owe d it s continue d e x i stenc e to Russia. 8 
Un s u rpr i si n g l y t hen, at t h e Con g re s s of Vienna i n 18 15 
P ru s s i a ra i se d n o o bje c tions to Russian ambit i ons in Pol a nd , and 
~ave a way he r g ai ns from Poland' s t hird parti t ion to Rus s i a . 
Desµit e t his lo ss Prussia retai ned Da n zi g, West P russi a , a nd 
Pose n , which was organized a s a n a u to n o mo u s g r a nd d uch y a n d 
p r o mis e d cultural privileges. S imilarl y , Russia's share o f Pol a n d 
was o r ganized as Congress Poland with t he Cz ar a s t he Polish 
Ki n g . 
c i t y . 
On l y Cracow remained as a genu i nely autonomous Polish 
F i n a l l y , Prussia also gained f ort y perc en t o f Saxo n y a s 
~. Imma nu e l Gei s s. " Germa n Ostpo li t i k a nd the Pol i s h Qu es tio n" . 
Ea s t _ Eu rope a n Quarterl y . vol XI X, no. 2 ( J un e 1 985 ): 20 3 . Th e 
pre v io u s tw o ti mes had been Russia's withdra wa l f r o m t he Seve n 
Ye ar ' s War a n d t h e Treat y of Ti lsit. 
• 
• 
• 
11 
well as some Western territories . 
Thus, through a c ombination o f mi li ta r y prowe s s, ~ood 
fortune and Russian favor, Prussi a was able to ca rve o ut a ni c he 
as t he last of the European Great Powe r s . In the proc e ss a 
spe c i al r elationship wi th Russ ia developed and the Lo n ~ hist 0 r v 
o f P rus s ian-German do mination o f the Po l es bega n . 
• 
• 
The Rise of Nat io na lism 
On e si~nifican t result of t h e Congres s of Vie n na was the 
Hol y Al liance for med be t we e n Russia, Aust ri a , a nd Prus s i a . This 
12 
grol1p o f co nservative mo narc hi es s aw in the Hol y Alliance a me ans 
of co ntain ing the li bera l ideals o f the F r e nc h revolution . Their 
powers were quickly put to the test as f resh revolu t ion sp read 
acro ss Europe . 
The first outb r eaks of popul a r revolu t ion took place i n 
Fr a nce and Be lgium in 1830. Thes e r evolts were qui c kl y f o llowed 
by a revolt in Russian Poland. The uprising in Congre ss Po land 
was ruthless ly crushed by the Russi a ns, who p ro ceeded t o strip 
the Polis h kingdo m of its remaining au t onomy . The Prussi a ns and 
Aust r ians meanwhile mobilized their armies in their sectio ns of 
o cc up i ed Poland to guard agains t the spread of the insurrec tion. 
In addi t i on, Prussia revoked the p riv i leges of Posen and 
i n i tiated a program of mi l d German ization . 
A second Polish revolt in 1846 was als o c ru s hed a nd resu lted 
i n Austria annexing the free city of Cracow . Following thes e 
revolts man y Poles fle d Congress Po land for the West . A p e ri o d of 
Polen bege i sterung, o r enthusiasm for Pole s, b r oke o ut a mon g German 
• libe rals . In e a rl y 1848 man y e v en c a ll ed f or wa r wit h Russi a to 
c r e at e an indepe ndent Poland. Co n scio us o f pressure f r o m th e 
• 
• 
• 
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Fr a nkfurt Asse mb ly , King Frederi c k Wilhelm IV a l lowed t h e 
c r eation o f a Polish ~ational Co mm ittee i n Pose n . 
l; e 1 · n P l n e n t h u s i as m f o r t h e Po 1 e s , how eve r , was s ho r t - .L i v e d . 
In Po sf> n, t he Pol ish Natio nal Co mmi t tee showed l ittle in te r es t 1. n 
. · o n p e r· r1 t i n g w i t h t he Ge r m a n mi n o r i t y and the r e we re i n c i d e n t s o f 
·:u1 t i - l ; e r m a n demo n s t rat i o n s . I n Frank f u r t , the de l e g a t e s w t~ r e 
._·i L l i ng to grant the Poles the r i ght to their Langu age, bu t ,;..;hen 
i t l·a me to dis pensing ter ri to ry or placi n g Ge rmans under Po lish 
aut o n o m:;,- , the German .Liberals succumbed to a rising German 
n ationalism and quickly forgot the "Polish question". 
These feeli n g s of nationa lism soon manifested themselves as 
a c hauvinistic , arrogant approach to the East. German thinker s 
bega n to ro manticiz e the role of the Ger mans in spreading cultu r e 
to the East. The historian Trietschke argued that prior to the 
c ol o ni z ati o n of the East the nat ive peoples were '' on the level of 
animals" . ~ Ot her academicians began to see the Germa ns as a 
"too l of God " which was meant to spread civili z ation to the 
inferior a nd unde rdeveloped Slav. lu 
These attitudes soon turned into a c al l for further Eastern 
expansion and Germanization . Mu ch of this spirit came fro m 
academ ic and student circles. i i One influential v o ic e from th i s 
9qtd . in Schreiber 180 . 
lOu b ran, 384 . 
11Sc hreibe r notes -that the popular acceptance of s u c h ideas , 
especial ly in academic circ les , led to several g eneratio n s of 
German schoolchi ldren l earning the ''doctrine that c ul tural 
inf lue n ce i n volve s the right to use fo r c e and co nfers the right to 
rul e '' (334) . 
• 
• 
• 
14 
group was Paul deLagarde, a u thor of Deutsc h e Sc h~ iften, which was 
regarded as th e "Bi ble" o f nationalist student g r o ups . 12 In 185 3 
he advocat e d the a b sorp tion of Russian Poland into a un i te d 
Ge rm any . Fur ther more , he urg e d Ger man s ettle ment of Eastern 
Eur o pe , incJudi n g; Pr ussian and .-\ 11st r ia n Poland, Httn ~a r \ · , d n d 
p r e s e nt - day Cze choslovaki a. Others, like the East Prussian 
d e moc r at Wilhelm Jordan noting the superiorit ;T of the Germ a n 
peopl e , spoke of the Ge rman " r ig ht o f c onquest" in the East . ;3 
Few vo i ces were he a rd in oppos iti on to su c h ideas wi thin Germa n y . 
Th tts , Ge rman liberals discarded t he ir ideals of freedo m and self-
determinati o n fo r the seduction of national is m . 
There are man y possible causes for the intense German 
nati o n a li s m that developed during the revolts of t he mid 
Ni n etee nth Ce ntury. First, nat io nalism served as a vehicle for 
unity among liberals t hroughout the German s t ates. Secondl y , 
Ger ma n un ity promised to bring power and i nfluence to the 
Ger ma n s . As Da h l mann, a historian of the time , noted: " , .. it 1s 
not onl y freedom t hat the Germans have i n mind , bu t t he y are 
primarily craving ·for power whi c h has been denied of the m until 
now" . 14 
Augmenting these already powerful f orces of nationali s m wa s 
the memory and idealization of past Ge rman colonies in the East. 
12 F .L. Cars t en. Essays in Ge rman Histor y . ( London: Ha mbledon 
Press, 1985), 22 1. 
13 Holborn I[, 103. 
14 qt d . i n Ha j o Ho l b o r n . A H i s t o r y o f Mod e r n Ge rm an v 1 8 4 0 -::Jc]_ 4 :) . 
(Prince ton : Pr i n ce ton Univers ity Press, 19 6 9), 1 0 2 . 
• 
• 
• 
This, a c co rding to Ashkenasi, gave Ge rm an nati o nali s m a 
"p ar-tL c ularly virulent c haracter" that e v e n t ual l v 1,,,·ould 
"gal\a n 1 z e it . • tt i 5 into c oncrete expansion . 
15 
15 Abraham Ashkenasi . Modern german _Ji!l. ional is m. (Ne w York : John 
Wil ey & So ns, 1976), 3 9. 
• 
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Bi sma rk and t he Second Emp i re 1862-1918 
The Polis h Question 
To Bis mar k, r es o lution of the Polish q ues tio n to Prus sia's 
adva n ta~e was of vi. tal importance, because Bis ma r ~ k l oo k~d upon 
the predo minately Polish provi nces of West Prussia and Posen Rs 
"Prussia's bes t si new s" . 10 The se p r ovinces bound Brand e nburg to 
East Prussia a nd t i ed t h os e t wo provi nc e s to Silesia . Bisma r ck 
1 6 
believed t ha t t he con t i nu ed su rvival of Prus s ia as a great power 
d e pe nded on pre ven ti ng t he lo ss of th i s r eg i o n by the creati o n of 
an i nde pendent Poland enc o mpassing t he borde r s of 1772 . Suc h a 
Pol and, he fear e d, wo uld not hesit a te t o abs o rb Si l e s ia and Eas t 
Pru s si a . Th is f ear c aused him to p ursue a st a u nc h a n ti - Polish 
policy . As he wro t e i n 18 61 : '' I have f u ll s y mpat h y with the i r 
co nd iti on bu t i f we want t o survi ve, we c an o n l y extermina c e 
t hem " . 17 
This bel i e f manifested i tself in Bi s ma r c k' s a tt e mpts t o 
Ge rman iz e the s o- c alled "Ea s tern Marche s " d ur ing t he 1880s . l n 
188 7, Bismarck f o r bade the teac h i n g of t he Po l ish lan gu a~e in 
Prussian Po l and. A Co lon izat i o n Commi ss i on was also for med wit h 
,: 
t he i ntent of encouraging Ge rman c o l on ization and bu y ing ou t 
Pol i sh landowne r s. Th e pro g r a m had only mi n i mal s uc c ess and wa s 
p r obab l y no t worth t h e e mn ity fo r Germans that d eveloped in the 
Poles . Betwee n 188 6 a nd 1915 o n l y about 21,000 Ge r man s et tle r s 
16qtd . in Ge is s , 204 . 
17Holborn II, 165 . 
• 
• 
• 
moved t o Prussian Poland 18 and in 1905 t he Poles s till ma de up 
4 5% o f the populatio n o f West Pruss i a and 55% o f Posen' s . :9 
17 
One o f th e pr i mar y tenets o f Bismarc k's fo r e ign pol i c v wa s 
t hat , g i ven th e e x i ste n c e of f i v e Grea t po wer s , i t was bes t to be 
par t of a t r io . Thus, Bi s mar c k co ntinue d to pursue c o o p e r atio n 
wi th the o t h e r t wo co n s ervat i ve monarc hies: Russia and Au s t ri a . 
P russian r el ations with Russia got off to a good start under 
Bi s ma r c k. I n large meas u re these good relations were g r o unded in 
the c o mmon desi r e to hold the forces o f Polish nationalism in 
c he c k . During the 1863 revolt in Co n g re ss Poland Genera l Gustav 
Alvensleben , wit h Bis marck 's approval, signed a co n ve nt io n with 
t h e Russians a llowing fo r collaborat ion between P russian a n d 
Rus si an mil i tary co mma nds in putting down the Polish revolt. Th is 
c onve n t i o n stre ngthened Russo-Prusso friendship . One co n s e qne nce 
wa s Russia n neutrality i n Prussia's wars leading to German 
uni f i c at i o n (1864 , 1866, and 1871), 
A s ec ond tenet of Bismarck's foreign policy was to rea s sure 
the other European Great Powers that German y was a sated sta t e . 
uninterested in further expans i on. Further expansion r isked 
upseting the balance of power a nd bring ing a c oal ition a gainst 
Germany. Therefore, Bismarck embraced a k leindeutsc h solution to 
18Eli z abe t h Wiskema nn . Ger man y ' s Easter.n Neighbor s : P r o bl ~_D!§ 
Rela t ing to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Cz eG h Frontier Region s . 
(London : Ox f o rd University Press , 1956), 14. 
19 Ferdinand Schevi ll. The Makin_g_of Mo d e rn _ _Q~_rm~ n y . (C h i c ago: 
A. C . Mcc lurg & Co., 1916), 231. 
• 
• 
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the German problem and attempted to avoid colonial entanglemen ts . 
Unfortunately for Bismarck, the world econo my of the day was 
l argely unsuited for such a policy. Ge rmany was a growing 
industrial state in need of l arge a moun ts of raw materials and 
markets. To succeed, Germany needed a f ree a nd secure 
in te rnat io nal e c onomy . ~ worldwide depressio n in the 1870s, 
howeve r, t riggered g lo bal protectio nism a nd caused i nsecur ity 1n 
the Ger mans . 
As Calleo poi nts out , the Ge rmans felt the ms elves to be at 
an econo mi c disadvantage co mpa r ed to the other Great Powers. The y 
had no e mpire like the British or a vast· resource-rich inte rior 
l . k R . ?O Th G b f l th d f t 1 e uss 1a . · e ermans egan t o ee e nee or g rea er 
econo mic secur ity and self-sufficiency. This involved s ec ur ing 
markets and sources o f raw material, as well as protecting 
domestic agricultural and industrial interests from f oreign 
co mpetition . Thus, against h is better wishes Bismarck was f orced 
to begin alte r i ng his policy towards protectionism and 
i mper ialism. 
This change in polic y mani f e sted itself in s e veral ways. 
First , it resulted in an active German colonial policy, the so-
call ed Weltpolitik . Mo re importantly for German Eastern 
relations, was the d e velopment o f the concept of Mitteleuropa and 
the virtual economic war with Russia t hat ensued. 
• 
20 Davi d Calleo . "Ge rman y and the Balance of Power" . In h'.~st 
German Foreign Po licy 1949-1979. Westview Special Studies i n West 
Europea n Politics and Society. ed. Wolfram F. Ha nr ieder . (Boul der: 
Westview Press , 1980), 3 . 
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The fir st seeds of a German Mit teleuropa we r e planted by the 
Austro - Ge rman treaty of 1879 . Much o f the imp e t us be hind this 
tr e a t y c a me from a desire by Bi smarck to f orm a Ce ntral European 
custo ms union . Suc h a union wo11ld p r ovid e Germany wi t h a lan~e 
ma r ket predi sposed to Ge rm a n c ont rol. Fu rthermore, an Au stro -
G e r rn a n a r r· a t I g e m e n t s e r v e d a s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n st Ru s s i an ex pan s i o n 
in the Balkans . 
Despite t he establishmen t of the Dreikaiserbu nd (Le ague of 
the Three Empero r s) in 1872 and its subsequent renewal in 1884, 
relations between Germa n y a nd Russia g rew strained. Wi th the 
s ub jugation of the Poles complete, the primary source of Russo-
• Ger ma n coope ration became less important. 
• 
P robl e ms began developing in the Russo-German rel a t ionship 
arou nd 1877. In that year Russ ian import tarriffs began a steady 
r i se that r e sulted in a halving of German e x ports to Russ ia by 
1887 . 21 Under pre ssure from East Prussian agricutural interests , 
tariffs were int r o duced on Russian grain i n 1880. These t a r iffs 
increased by a factor of six over the f ollowing seven yea rs and 
the res ulting los~ of earning s proved detrimental to Russia's 
industrial growth. 
A growing pan-slavist spiri t and Russian expansionism in t h e 
Balkans also caused problems for Russo-German relations. The 
Russians were g reatl y disappointed in their Balkan gains 
fo llowi n g Bismarck's "honest brokering" at the Congres s of Be rl in 
21Hans- Ul ri c h Wehler. The German Emp i r e : 1871-191 8 . trans . Kirn 
Tra y nor (New Yo rk: berg Publishers, 1985 ), 191. 
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1n 18 78. Furthe rmore Bismark's efforts to intimidate Russia and 
cool her Balkan expansion by halting tra de in Ru s s ia n se c urit ie s, 
bac kf i r ed badly by for c ing Russia t o s ee k finan c ial assi s tanc e 
f r o m Fr a nce . 
Th11 s , a shift i n econo mi c a nd p o lit ica l realiti e s br ou\s ht q 
shift t o Ge rman fo r e ign po l i c y . The pe r c ei v ed need for s ec ure 
ma r ke t s Rn d raw materials caused the Germans to on c e again turn 
Lo expa n s i o n . The new German inte r e s t in Mitteleuropa p u t German y 
o n a co l l ision cours e with Russia . 
Wilhelmian Germanv 1890 -1 918 
Trade policy c hanged little under Bismarck' s successo rs . 
• Li k e Bismarc k, Capr ivi (1890 - 5) recogn i zed the negative ef fects 
t hRt pro tectio ni s m had on foreign relations , but was forced b y 
• 
do mest i c press ure to c ontinue protectionist policies . Upturns in 
t he wo rld eco n o my did no thing to ease trade restrictions. German 
i nse c uri t y pe rsisted and under Bulow (1900-1909) i mperialism and 
p r o te c tionis m be c ame the poli cy of favo r. 22 German y began 
dumping industrial goods on Austria a nd Russ ia wh ile maintainin g 
h igh agricultural tariffs. Taylor asse r ts that the ta r iffs were a 
" weapon of war" aiming "to destroy co mpetition b y du mping, a nd 
l t • t 1 t 11 b l • II 23 u . 1ma e y, o enro consumers y c ompu s 10n . 
I n the di plomatic sphere, relations with Russia continued t o 
')') 
""By t his ti me German leaders al so realized the domesti c 
active i mper ialist policy . 
me t hod of distracting the 
po l it i cal utilit r y of maintaining an 
Colonialism proved to be an excellent 
pu b l ic fro m issues of internal reform . 
•)•) 
. JTaylo r 126. 
• 
• 
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wor s en. In 1890, Capr i vi turned do wn a n offer to rene go t i ate the 
Rei n s urance Trea ty si g n e d b y Bi s mar c k i n 1887 . Co mp e t itio n 
be twe e n Au s t ria and Russia in the Balkans grew ke ene r. In 1909 , 
f o llow ing the Austr i an anne x at io n of Bos n i a, Aust r ia was o n t he 
verg e of wa r with Ru s si a and Se rb ia . Ge rma n y , ho we ve r, i n t e r c e d e d 
by send ing a ve iled t hr e a t t o Russi a , advi sing her t o acce pt t he 
s tat u s quo. Although the Russ ia ns backed down in the Summer of 
1909 , t he y would not do so a g a i n five years l a t er during t he 
Ba lka n c risis of 1914 . 
German War Aims 
The German rationale at the beginning of the World War I 
was that Germany was fighting to defend herself from the o t her 
powers, who had forced the war upon her . Soon, however, forces 
throughout Germany began to call for annexationist poli c i es . The 
c r y was taken up by academicians, the military, industr i a l is ts , 
and the pan-Germans. As these groups began to propagat e 
annexationist ideas they became immensely popular. 
The first set of German war aims was produc ed as ea r l y a s 
September 1914, In the West, areas of France were to be a bsorbed 
a nd Belgium -made a satellite state . In the East, mos t of Ce n t ral 
... 
Europe woci!d be placed under a German-controlled economi c s y s t em. 
Finally, a section of Polish territory was to be taken t o f o rm a 
border strip between the Poles of Prussia and a new Po lish s ta t e 
t o be formed from Russian Poland. Poles would be e xpelled fro m 
• th is s t rip and replaced by German col onists. As Ho l born po ints 
o ut , i t i s important to note that Chan c ellor Be t hmann-H o l lwe g 
• 22 
rel ie d more on enforcing German contro l thro ugh satellite states 
a nct eco no mi c controls than direct anne xation . 24 
Fo ll ow in g st unning Ge rman mil ita r y successes 1n the Eas t, 
Ge rman y 's expansionist plans began to grow . One reason was tha t 
t he blockade of Ge rman y instituted at t he begi nn ing o f t h e wa r 
highligh t e d Ge rm a ny's dependenc e on i mpo r t s . We hl e r e mph asizes 
tha t eco nomi c autarky dominated German thinking a fter 19 16, 
c r eati ng a demand for the annexation of la r ge parts of Russia to 
gain sources of food and raw materials . 25 A racialis t aura also 
began to surround German eastern annexations. In 1915, Gene ral 
Ludendorff stressed that Russia would provide "the breeding 
• stations for the people who will be essential for further 
struggles in the east" . 26 
• 
The seriousness of German intentions is illustrated by the 
1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In it, Russia was forced to give up 
her r i ghts to Poland, Estonia, Livonia, and the Ukraine. German 
forces, however, went even further advancing as far as 
Trancaucasia and into the Crimea. The Germans also concluded 
treatie s with Romania, which guaranteed Germany of economic 
control . 
Thus, in Germany's war aims a clear pursuit of Mitteleuropa 
can be recognized . The expansionist and racialist policies 
exh i bited in this pursuit were but the precursors of a second 
24 Holborn II, 449 . 
25 Wehler, 212. 
26 I bid., 213. 
• 23 Ge rma n attempt at European hegemony a mere twenty years later . 
• 
• 
• 
The Weimar Republic 1919-1933 
The Ea rl v Years 19 19-1 923 
24 
l n Nov e mber 1918 , Ge rman y was a defeated natio n. The kaiser 
had abdicated and a new republi c had been proclai med . A few 
months later the Par i s Peace Conference convened . The resulting 
Treaty of Versailles placed crushing demands on the new German 
govern me nt. In additio n to accepting primary guilt fo r the war, 
the Germans we r e also faced with heav y reparations. Furt hermo re, 
the treaty c ontai ned provisions f or territorial re visi on. In the 
East , both Posen and West Prussia were turned o ver to Pol a nd, 
p r oviding Poland with access to the Baltic, as well as s e parating 
• East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Danzig, c onsidered vital 
to Polis h commerce, was made a free city and placed under the 
contro l of the League of Nations . Memelland, a strip of land 
between East Prussia and Lithuania, was also placed under League 
c ontrol. Finally, Upper Silesia was ordered to hold a plebi scite 
to choos e between Germany and Poland . 
• 
The result of the plebiscite, held in March 1 92 1, showed 
s ixty percent of the population in favor of remaining wit h 
Germany . In spite of this, Poland claimed that the c ommunes had 
elected for Poland. To complicate matters, the Polish communes 
did not form a bloc, but instead were dispersed throughout Upper 
Silesia . Called upon for a ruling, the League of Nations 
determi ned t hat Poland would receive nearly ha lf of Upper Silesia 
co ntaining 3/4 of t h e province's i ndustr y and mi nes, as wel l as a 
substantial German mi nority. The tota l German l osses fro m the 
• 
• 
• 
Treat y o f Versailles included t en p e r c ent o f her population and 
fo ur tee n percent of her territor y , most of whi c h was in the 
i? East . "' 
25 
Ger man pttbli c opinion wa s passionatel y opposed to th e Treat y 
of Ve rs ai_l Les . In terms of eastern relati o ns this manifested 
it self as st ron g a nt i - Pol ish feelings . Wiske ma nn poin t s out t hat 
Lhe Germans found the e x istence of a Polish state with a German 
minor it.v "h u miliating" and ".i ntolerable" . 28 
As mi g ht be expected , German foreign policy concerned itself 
with re vi sing the Treaty of Versailles and returning Germany to 
t he s t atus of a major power . One way of returning international 
standing to Germany was through a revival of diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Unio n. Germany and the Soviet Union had mu c h i n 
co mmon during the days immediately following World War I. Both 
we re internatio nal pariahs. Both were seriously weakened 
eco n o micall y and militarily. Finally, they shared a c ommon 
dislike for the new Polish state. 
The topic of relations with the Soviet Union was a highl y -
c harged one in German industrial, military, a nd political 
c irc les. Heavy industry, recogn izing the Soviet Union as a source 
of large markets and raw materials, was strongly in favor o f 
c lose econo mic ties . The Reichswehr supported close relations on 
the bas i s of potential military links. The Communists, who 
27 John R . P. Mckenzie, Weimar Germanv, 1918_-::..1~11 , (Totowa , 
N.J. Rowman and Rittlefield, 1971), 65 . 
'! 8wi s kemann, 17 -8. 
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nat urally suppor ted closer relatio n s , were joined by the 
nationalists who saw relat i ons with the Soviet Un i o n as a means 
26 
o f gaining stre ngth a nd diplomatic room o f ma n e u ve r vjs a vis the 
Western Al l ies . On ly the majority so c ia l is t s were oppo s ed l o 
cl oser Ger ma n - Soviet rel a tions, e x pressing co n c ern thqt t he ~es t 
would f ind the m a t hreat a nd block Germany ' s e ffo r ts l o at t .' t l! J 
r evisio n of the Versailles t reaty . The failur e of Foreign 
Mi nis te r Ra t henau ' s Erfuel l ungspolitik (poli cy of fulfillment) to 
gain a n y conce ss i ons fro m the West, h o we ve r, cau sed the 
soc ia l ists to withdraw thei r opposit i on. 
Ec onom ic dis cu ss i ons wi th the USS R began in 19 2 1. Th e 
Ge rmans proposed a n international consortium to finance 
ind u st r ia l inve stme nt in the Soviet Un i on. Le e a nd Mi c halka 
as s e r t that through this c onsortium the Germa ns hoped to fir s t 
gain equality with their Western partners and e v entually achieve 
eco n o mic d ominance over the Soviet Union. This would se r ve 
several purposes. German economic dominance wou l d gi v e the 
Germans more influence in revising the Treaty of Versailles . l t 
wo uld also enable Germany to mor e easily pay her reparations 
debt . Finally , it wo uld fulfill the desire for a German-d o minat e d 
~it teleuro pa . 29 The So viets, howe ver, did not take the bait . 
Believing that the cons o rtium i dea would infringe to mu c h o n 
t heir national sovereignty, the Soviets withheld approv a l . 
The All i es proceeded to propose an economic co nference fo r 
29Marshal l Lee & Wolfgang Mi c halka. Ger man Forej_gn __ Poli_ c v, 
1917-1 933 : Continuity or Break? ( Ne w York: Berg, 19 87) , 53 - 4 . 
• 
• 
• 
2 7 
Ap ri l 1922 i n Genoa t o d i s c u s s t h e r eco n s truction of Central a n d 
Easte r n Euro pe . De sp i te t he ir p r io r i nability to co me to a n 
ec o n o mi c a gree ment , both Ger ma ny a nd t he Sov i et Un io n fe a r e d t hat 
each wou l d co me to te rm s wit h t he Al l ies a t th e o ther ' s e xpe n se . 
This co ncer n led t he Sov i ets a nd Ge rm a n s to pr i vately r e a c h a n 
nccord during t h e co11rs e of th e c o n fe r e nce, the r r ea t:v o f 
Rapallo . T he t r ea t y se rv e d s eve r al p ur poses . It s ettled clai ms 
Left ove r fro m th e Wo rld War I . gav e both s t ate s more roo m f o r 
diplo ma ti c ma neu ve r v is a v i s the Wes t, a nd r es u me d t r a de 
l t . :JO .... l . t . l d r e a i o n s . ,·11 1 a ry c o o pe r a tio n a s o e n s u e . Th e Ge rman s we r e 
a ll owed t o bui l d a n d u t i lize mun i tion s fact o ries and traini ng 
fa c il i ti e s in r e tur n for shari n g t heir expe r tise wit h th e 
Sov ie t s . Th i s tre a ty i n it i at e d a pe r iod of Germa n balan cing o f 
Eas t and West k n ow n as Schau kelp o lit ik. 
The St r e semann Ye a r s 1 923 -1 929 
Gust a v S trese mann b e came c h a n c el lo r and fo r eign mi n ister 1n 
Au g u s t 1 9 2 3 . Wh il e rema i ning c h a ncellor f o r o n l y a few months, h e 
nevertheless , h el d t he p o s t o f f o reign ministe r f o r s i x ye a rs . An 
a nne x ationist during the Wo r ld War I , Stre s e man n pursued man y o f 
t h e s ame g9als as his pre d e c e sso r s i n the fore i g n office . I n a 
192 5 l etter to the former Crown P r ince he wrote t ha t so lutio n of 
the re p a rations p roblem, ma i n te n a n ce o f the peac e, and 
te r rit o r ial r e visio n i n the Eas t, i n c l uding the r ecover y of 
30 Germany b e came t h e Sovi e t Un ion's most i mpor t an t t radi n~ 
par t n e r , s ee Dean , We st Germa n Trade Wit h th e Ea st: the Po l itical 
Dime n s ion, p . 100 , a nd t he Sovi e ts became th e la r gest b u ye r o f 
Germa n i ndustrial g o ods du r i n g t h e i nt e rw a r p e ri od , s ee Lee a nd 
Micha l ka , p . 14 7. 
• 
Da n zig and t he Po l ish Co r rido r we r e h is p r i mar y go a ls . Ji 
S tr e s e ma n n purs u e d th e s P 2;o a l s t hroug h a p o l i cy of 
\ _e .rst. !""1n__d i _g_1,_rng~9 l j _tjJs , o r i n te r nat i o n a l under s t a nding. He fe l t 
t h :-1 t c J. o s e r· t i e s w i t h t h e We s t w o u l d a i d re v i s i o n o f t he f r e a t y 
0 f Ver~ai l l e s . In L9 2 4, S t re se ma nn r e quest e d a d mis si o n t o t h e 
!. P a~11e o f ,\iatio n s . He b t? Li e v ed that a dmission wo u ld e n ha n c e 
GP r ma n y ' s i nt e rnat io n a l s t a nd i ng a nd aid revision. Th i s 
28 
h y po thes is wa s borne o u t b y a new willin g ness a mong t h e F r e n c h t o 
e n te r j n to n e go t ia t i o ns follow i ng Germany's enthusi a stic dri v e to 
e n t er th e Leag ue. This wi llingness to negotiate led to t he 
Lo c arn o Co n fe ren c e of Oc tober 1925 . The meeting's resulting 
• treaty se r v ed t o ma inta i n the territorial status quo in t h e We st . 
• 
Ge r ma n y , F r a n c e, and Be l gium pledged non-aggression i n the i r 
r e lati o n s and Bri tai n a nd Italy promised to prote c t Ge rman y f ro m 
u npro v oked French aggressio n. 
Imp o r tan t l y , t he treaty did not hinder, and in fact s erve d 
t o a id S t r e semann's eastern policy . Desp i te the desire of 
Ge r man y ' s e astern neighbors to conclude s ome type of "eas te r n 
Loc arno", Stresemann made sure t o avoid recognition of Ge r ma n y' s 
e as tern f rontiers. Furthermore, with secure wes tern borders, 
Germany would be in a better position to apply force to eastern 
r ev i si o n. France would only be able to take action a gainst 
Ger man y i f s h e was proved to be the agg ressor. Ge rman for ce s 
co uld b e f a r i nt o Poland bef o r e this determination c o u l d be ma d e 
-- ------ - --------
.Ji E . - t t d d r1 c ~ u o n, e . an 
Qj,a r i e s , Lette rs and Papers, 3 
Co mpa n y , 1 9 3 5- 4 0), II : 50 3 -5 . 
trans . , 
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anrl ac tion taken . Th is possibil itv does not se e m so fa r - fetche d 
wh e n o ne cons iders t ha t as earlv as lat e 192~ the Ge rma n 
2 o v e rnm e nt was se n di n g f e e l er s t o the Sov iet Li ni o n exploring the 
poss i b i l ity o f .j o intly µ ushine; t-lo Land bac k to her e t hni c 
'J•) 
fr 0 n t 1e r s b~· fo r ce . ·,_ 
Incn"asin2; c;erma n co o peration with th e \\ est , <is s,· mbol i. ze d 
by t he Treat y o f Loc a rno, caus e d co nc e rn i n t h e Sov ie t Li n io n. ln 
an effo rt to allay So vie t worr ie s , a s we ll as to con tinu e the 
policy o f $c haukelpolitik and Ge rman diplo mat ic independence , 
Ger ma ny co n c luded t h e T reat y of Be rlin with t he US S R in 1 9 26 . 
Thi s t reaty reaffirmed the Trea ty of Rapallo. It als o i mpli ed 
t hat the Soviet Union would sign no peace treat y that would 
guarantee Poland's easte rn fron t ier . 33 Cooperation wi t h the USSR 
wo ul d c o n tinue until 1932 when inc reasing Commun ist activ it y 1 n 
Germany and t he signing of a Soviet - Polish non-agg ression treaty 
c aused relations to deteriorate . 
Foreign Poli cy 1930-1933 
Fol lowing S tresemann's death in 1929, German f o r eign p o li c y 
go a ls remained largely unchang e d. Revisi on of the T r eaty o f 
Versai lles and improving German y 's i n te rnationa l stature remained 
paramount. Steps were taken to inc rease German y 's power through 
e c onomic means . Foreign Minis te r v on Neurat h called for the 
sei z ure o f new markets and ef fo rts to p r event Eastern Europe fro m 
? 2 
' Wiskemann 18 . 
. ,. 
, j Ga ines Post Jr . The Civil Mi lita r y_ Fabri c g _f. _}Y~E'b ll.!.tt.r ~ot'Pl .~D 
Eo l _u;:_y . (Prince ton: P r i n ce ton Li ni versi_ty P ress , 1 973 ), ~6 . 
• 
i.nrl11stria l izi ng, addi n g that th e t_ier ma n minori tie s in th o se 
co1 in t rie :; co uld be especiall.v he lpftd ·; 4 i.n tha t e ffort . · 
,J er,:n.,-u 1:,.· pursued clo se econo mi c ti.es wi.th t h e states o f 
3U 
so11tr1eas t Eur o pe , offering to L, tke t h e ir a'5 ric ul t ura L g o ods i n 
rE-·t1.1n 1 for ,"l r e duce d ta ritf o n Ger m:-1n ae;ri c ultur a l p r od '! ct.:~. !'he 
r (') ...::. 1 1 l t '-"' a s I~ c r) no m i c d e p e n de n c AC' o n C e rm A. n y . A~ain th e spe cu, r o!' 
a n t::'~_·o n o1n 1c al Ly - defi n e d "li tJ:c.~Le L.U.:QP_0c Loo med . The Uerm;,. n s f ur·the r 
p :_;r·s1 1-"' d t h i"' co n c ept with t h e a tte mpted Austrian Custo ms Lni o n 
P,'o .iec t o f 1931, wh ich was aba n doned due to Al l ied pressure . 
[n man y ways Weimar fore ign poli c y mirrore d tradit ional 
Germa n diplo macy . Firs t , co n t r o l of Prussian Polan d remained 
• i mp o r ta nt jn the mind s of Ge rm a n leaders. An i mportant aspe ct of 
• 
1- he de s i red rev i s i on o f t h e T re at y o f Ve rs a i 11 e s was t he r e t u r n 
o f Ge rman y ' s lost easter n t e rritor i es . During the e arl y 30s State 
Secreta r~' Bi llow e ven spoke of this in te rms of another pa rt ition 
of ~o land . 35 Seco ndl y, t he re e mergence of the Polish q uesti o n, 
i n additi o n to c ommon ec onomic and politica l interests caus ed t h e 
So vie t Lln ion and Ge rman y to rees t ablish t he traditional 
f r·i endship that had begun to sour 1n the late 1800s. Finall y , t he 
concept of Mitteleuropa continued to play a part in Ger man 
thi nking during the Weimar pe r iod , as German y pursued a poli c y of 
eco n o mi c do minati on toward h er eastern neighbors . 
'
4 Lee & Mich a lka 14 ti . 
l~I b id., 145 . 
• 
The Third Reich 1933-1945 
The eastern policy of Adol f Hi t l e r wa s bo t h a co nt i n uatio n 
~ n ri a n expan s ion of forei g n polic y begun durin~ the Weimar ye a r s . 
Like the leade rs of the Weimar era Hi tl e r sought a r etur n of the 
Los t e astern territo ri es and cl u n g to the id e a o f a Ger ma n-
d o mi_n at e d Mi t tel e ur o pjl , Hit le r's p lans, h o weve r, went t' .a r 
the i d e as of me r e revisionis m. Citing the Ger man n ee d for 
Le ben s raum and Germa n racial superiori ty , he ca lled for· t he 
'J' 
''co n q uest , c oloni z ation, and do mination" o f the East . "0 
Hitler was a fir m believer in the need for Ger man au t ark y . 
He c onte nd ed, as had the leaders of I mperial Ge rman y , that 
• Ge rma n y requ i red mo re terri t ory , control o f her o wn n a tur a l 
r e so urces , and a larger population to be a world power. On ly by 
pursuing continental hege mon y o v er Europe could Ger man y avoi d 
• 
being eve n t ual ly subjugated by t h e rising power of the Li nit e d 
Stat e s and t he Soviet Union. Thus, t h e ''European balanc e [of 
po wer] would be sacrifi c ed for the world balance" . 37 Hitl e r 
be li e v ed that Imperi al Germany's great e st error had bee n the 
policy of Weltpolitik, Hitler felt that a simultane o us global Rnd 
continental policy would be impossible to mainta i n, a nd t hat a 
I 
gl o bal poficy served to alienate Ger man y ' s "natural al l y" Gr eat 
36william Griffith . The Ost_12ol i ti k of the __ Fe_d e r al _ R~_p_1-_1b~ic ,J t 
~~e_r_[!)g. n v . ( Cambridge , Ma ss .: MI T Pr e ss , 1978 l, 15 . 
·q 
., Calleo II , 5 . 
• 
• 
• 
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Britai n . 38 
Hitle r' s eastern poli c:v was also d o minated by rac i s m. In 
part , rhi. :, can be see n as an exte ns io n ot· thinking that began 1n 
the m1d -ri in eteenth ce n tury . H1tJ. e r wa s fascinate d by the Teutoni c 
f\ n i g: h t s n. n, i t he i r " miss ion " to the Ea s t . H i s t h i n k i n 'd; , ho·., e , . e r , 
was e s peci al i v virulent . Hitler's 1 n terpretatio n ot' Soc 1 ctL 
Dar winis m Left him with the bel ief that the slavs were s ubhuman s 
mean t to be ensJaved or exterminated . T hese beliefs r, ro v ided the 
rai son d _'etat fo r a Ge rman - rul e d co lonial e mpir e in th e East. 
We inbe r~ poi n ts o ut t hat the cha n ge i n foreign policy goals 
f rom me r e re v isionism to actual e x pansi o n prov ided Ge rm a ny with 
additi o nal diplo mati c options. Rather tha n co ntinuall y pushin~ 
for revision as did t he Weimar Republi c , Hi tler felt free to 
relax tensio ns i n t he hopes of future gai ns later . As Weinberg 
ill u s trates: 
The ol d policy f itted in t o a v is i on of an Eastern 
Europe in whi c h Ger man y played a g r eate r pa r t ; the new 
policy was designed to pro vid e the basis for a n Eastern 
Europe under German do mination. The i mplication o f 
revisionist agitat i on was c h ange, signi fica n t b ut measured; 
short term quiescence on the othe r hand, mi ght lay the 
~i l b id . Hitler c orrectly r ecognized t hat Britain was a powe~ 
in de c li ne. He fel t t ha t Bri tai n shou l d be ea~e r to a l ly herself 
with Ge rman y because t h e US SR and t h e Uni t ed States wo u ld pose a 
greater th r eat to t h e Britis h Empire tha n a Ge rm a n do minated 
co nt inent . 
• 
• 
•• 
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!a; r o und wor k fo r later revo l u ti o n ar y upheaval . j9 
This p hilosophy helps to e ~ plain th e improve d relati o ns with 
Poi a11d th a t d e v e i o ped duri n g Hit le r's f irst y ears in power . 
u~~t te r· Ge rma n - Po li s h reL:i. ti o n s , Le ading t o the ten - .vea r n o n -
~1~ ! Pssi o n pac t s i g ne d in 19 3 4, s erved man y purposes f o r H i t l e r . 
F L r· s t , i t we a k e n Pd t h e f r· an c o - Po l i s h a 11 i an c e , a n a t 11 r a l (_j e rn1 a n 
~o al Lo eas e later e xpansion. Second, it provided pro tectio n f o r 
\,re r·mi:iny ' s ea s te rn flan k whi le Hitle r wa s pursuing Ans c hluss wit h 
,-\ 11 s t ri a a nd the a nne xatio n of Czechoslovakia . 40 
Fina lly, Hitl er viewed the Soviet Un ion as his eve n t ual 
e n e my , a nd he was willing to ally himse l ·f with Poland against the 
Sovi e t s . In Nove mb e r 1938, Foreign Minster von Ribbentropp urged 
Po l a nd to join the a nti- Comintern Pact as part of a deal that 
wo 11ld return Da n z ig to German y and create an extra te rri torial 
t·ai l way a c r o ss the Polish corridor . Althoug h the offer seemed to 
t ac i tly r e c o~nize Polish sovereignty over the c orridor, Marsh a l 
Ryd z - Smi g ly recognized that Poland was doomed to become a 
satell i te state if she aligned herself too closely to either o f 
her power ful neighbors, especiall y if she became a base for 
Germany's military operations against t he Soviet Union. 
• I 
Poland's refusal to cooperate merely led Hitler to se e k a 
new route t o his g oal. If Pol and would not be a willing 
sa t ellite , she would be brought into the fold by force . Although 
J3Ge rhard Weinberg. The Foreign 
va l . 1, ~iploma tic RevolutiQn in 
Univer s i t y of Chicago Press, 19 70 ), 
41) Holborn II , 788 . 
Policy of Hitler' s 
Europe 19 3 3 - 3 6. 
86 . 
Germ a n v , 
( Ch i cago: 
• 
• 
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hi s plans f or expan sio n still e nv i sioned conflict with the US SR, 
Hitl e r fe l t f r e e to sig n a non- a ggre ssio n pact with the So vie ts 
in Aug11s t 1~3 '.-:i. Secret articles in the treaty p r ovided for th e 
djvi s i. o n o f Po land between Germany a nd t he L'SSR . fhus , e VPc1 
thou~h h is methods may have seemed different fro m those 0f the 
pas L , o r n. t t i me s i. n co n s i st en t , H i t Le r ' s g 'J al s i n East e r n i· 1 u · o j:.H ::' 
wer·e the same ;-1,s those outlined in Imperial Ger man y's World Wc1.r I 
aims, Ge r man c ontrol o f t~e East as far as the Vo lga . 
Hitler' s policy i n so uthe as t Eur ope was also c onsi ste nt with 
t hat of h is predecessors . He atte mpted to set u p an ar·ea o f 
Ger man eco n o mi c and political dominan c e. The roots of the 
Austr ian Anschluss of 1938 can be found i n the fai led Au strian 
Cust o ms Uni on of 19 31 . Foreign trade p olic y r e ma i ned similar to 
that p r evio usly p r act i c ed. Germany took large a mounts of 
Hungarian and Yugosl avian agr ic ultural products when the 
int erna tional ma rket was poor maki ng the e c onomi es of these t wo 
states became depende nt on German y . Likewise Germany became a 
majo r buye r of Ro manian oil and Bul ga ri a n ores, i n return fo r 
whi c h Germany supplied arms. By makin g these states economi call ~ 
depe ndent on German y Hitl er was ab l e to e xe rt consi de r ab le 
politic al influence. For e x ample, h e was a bl e to g et those 
nations to s upport, or at least not stand i n t h e way , of his 
moves a gainst Cz e c hoslovakia. 
Ano the r i mp o r tant aspe c t of Hitler's eastern policy was h is 
• use 0f the east.ern minority groups . Following World war l l a n~e 
n u mbers of German - speaki ng peoples were to be fo und in the n ew 
• 
• 
• 
st.a t es of Eas t e rn Europ e : 80 0 , 0 ()1j in Pola nd 1· , ~ , 800 . 000 1n 
-. I, l l . 4 2 1_. zec [l OS ova.;: 1a , 800 . 000 in Romania 1\ a nd 500,000 Ln 
' ] 
H 1 : n ~-'lt · ,. · . \l tt10 1 1 g h S t re s e ma rt n a n d o t h e r s 1 n t h e \~ e i ma r R. e JJ u ti l i c 
h ,1.ri ,q ! t erni:-teci ro u se the c ause o f the min o riti es to fac ilj t at e 
t'P '. ·:"1 ,,n L,f rhe i" r e aty o f Versail l es , rheir e ff or- r.s h:1d pr'o ve n 
1 ;1 •·.:: r>I \ r"r-• 1:tless . lvf o r eo,·e r. Stresemann h ad ttitima tei · b e e n 
35 
1·ur·ce d l" D Aban d o n a min o riti es po licv beca1 1se it c o nlli c ted wi U , 
r.ne . ' ' d . l . . k 15 .2; 0·-1Ls o t ve rstaen _ 1°· u ng__wo _1t 1 , . · 
rl iLLer . o n t he othe r h and , playe d the min o rit ies issue like 
a '- · i r·t u oso . Co ntrol of minor it y g r oups and move men t s passed to 
Berl i n and t hey became instruments of Germa n fo rei gn poli c y . As 
Hi tler sai d to a group o f mi norit y leaders in 1934 : 
As the most advan c ed v angu ard of our campaign for 
Ger ma nv yo u wil l e nable us t o deplo y o ur forces and i n itia te 
0 11r manoeuvres . . . You will act as l i stening posts a n d prepare 
t he grou nd for c ertain ent e rprises ... Consider y o urselves o n 
. . 46 
act1vP. service . 
The German movement in the Cz e choslo va k i a took all its order s 
t'ro m Be rlin . T h ei r a gitation served as a p ret ex t for Ge rman 
q Wiskemann, 39 . 
4
' Ibid . , 51 . 
, ·· 
' ' Gerha rd L . Weinberg . The Foreign Po l i _cy o f Hit ler's Ger mcl.JlY , 
vol . 2, Sta rt i ng World War II : 1937 - 1939 . ( Chi c ago : Un iversit y of 
Ch i c a£{o Press , 1980), 234 . 
1=. 
· Lee & Michal ka, 95 - 6 . 
ni qtd . i n Sc hreiber . 
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d e ma nds for a nne xati on o f t he S1 1det e n i a nd . Hi tl e r's co nt r ol of 
thes e gro u ps is de monstrated b y th e lac k of a c tivi ty o n t h e pa r t 
o f min o rit y gr o ups in Po land un ti l a fte r t he f inal dem i s e o f 
Czec h o sl o v a k i a and t he Po lish r ef u sa l to r eac h a n a cco rd w1 t •1 
Ge rmany i n e arl y L~ 3 9 . 
Wo r ld Wa r [ I b e ga n o n Se pt e mber l, L8 3 J w ith Germ a n y'~ 
i nvasio n o f Po l a n d . As east e rn te r r it o r y was c onq u e r ed, Hi t le r 
be g a n se t ting up h i s easte r n e mpire . Mu c h o f Po l and be c a me part 
o f Great er Ge rma ny , t h e rest be i n g plac e d u nder the aus p i c e s of 
the Gove rnme n t - Ge n e r a l fo r t he Occ u p i e d Pol is h Reg io n s . Occ up ied 
Rus s ia was o r g an i zed i n t o t wo Rei c hs ko mmisar iat s . A p r og ram o f 
• i n t ens e Ge rm a ni za t io n t ook place . For e xampl e , Po l i sh languag e 
e du c atio n ende d . Ch ildren we r e o nl y tau gh t Ge rma n a n d the n o n ly 
just eno u gh t o be a bl e to funct i on . 
I 
For a fe w b r ie f ye a rs Hitl e r's dream o f a vast e mpire to t he 
East a nd a Ge rman - dominated Mit t eleurop a c a me t r ue . It was n o t to 
la s t, by Apr il 19 4 5 t h e Soviet s we re i n ru i ned Be rlin . The end o f 
Wo r l d Wa r I I brought an end to the e r a of t h e Gr eat Po we r s . In 
t h e new bipol ar wor l d German y wo u l d b e fa c e d wi t h f r esh 
challe nges -as wel l a s tradi tio n a l co nc ern s . 
• 
• 
• 
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Po st-Wa r Germany and t he Adenauer Era ( 1945 - L963 ) 
The f ace of Eu r ope was radi c ally change d b:-,· World Wa r [I . 
Ea s t P ri 1 ~ s i_ n "' 0 t ·; d i v i d e d be twee n Po l an ct and t he So v i e t L n i. o n . T h e 
S o v i t.> t lJ ri i u n ad o p r. e d t h e t_'. u r z o n l i n e a s i t. s b o rd e r· w 1 t h Pu L . rn d 
an d in co mp e r1satL o n Poland's border was moved l UO mile s westward . 
Po L a nd t oo k u v e r S i. L e s i a , 1:-' o s e n , and \\i e s t P r u s s 1 a . \\ h a t r· e ma L n e d 
of Ge rman y was divided into four z ones of occupat i o n. I nt o Lhese 
zo n es po u red 12 , 000,000 Ger man r e fu gees fro m t h e East, mRny of 
4i 
whom had been expe lled by the nat i ons of Easte rn Euro pe. 
Sc hreibe r su ms up th e significance of th i s: 
The 25 ye a rs between the trea ty of Ve rsailles and the 
col lap se o f the Germa n eastern front i n the Second World ~ar 
saw the destr u cti on of everything c reated by Ge rm a n p easant s 
and mo nk s , mine r s and artisans, burgesses a nd k n ig h ts in the 
c ou r se of a millennium. A single generation had to wi t n ess 
h . f h k f h. 48 t e ruin o t e wor o t 1rty . .. 
The end of World War II also signaled the e nd of Soviet -
Western c oo pe ration . Disagreements, mi s understandings, a n d t he 
co nflicti n g g oa l s o f t h e superpowers l ed to the bipolarizat ion of 
Europe a n ~ its di v is i o n into two hostile blocs . At the cente r of 
this bipolar izat i on was Ge rmany . Tensi on between t he two 
superpowers left the m un a b le to reach an ag r ee me n t on Germany's 
future . In 1948 , the si x n ation London Co nference c al led for the 
c r eation of a We st Ge rman government . Shortl y thereafter the 
47 Dean , 2 4 . 
dK ~ h . b 
.. ~c r e 1 er, 298 . 
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fn:>nch mer g ed the i r z on e of occu pation with those of the United 
States a nd Brit ain to for m Tri zo nia . T he sta~e was se t for the 
f 0 r-r11 a L Lon o f a \'. es t c; er ma n ~ o v e n 1 me n t . 
A ~acliame n ta r v Co un c Ll 1-,·rl.s co n ve n e d made u p of 65 
r r' 1,r·psentntives 01' the Ge r-m a n s t a tes i. n t he hestern zo ne . The 
['P s: 1Lt ,;.,·a s r- h e basi. c L .'tN LG_r ~1od~rs.~t~l of May l::!4~ . T he Basi c Law 
cl, t imed to 1·e pr·e s enL ail Lie r·mans un til those i n the East we re 
~i. ve n t're ed o m of c h o i ce . At that ti me t he Basic law wo ul d be 
r·epiaced b.v a c onstit u t i.on " a do p t ed by fr e e decisio n of the 
' • .. 
4 J 11 . Ge c ma n people . · Fo owi ng t he c rea t i o n of the Federal Rep ubli c 
of German y IF RG) f ro m t he We ste r n z one s, · the Soviets a l lowed the 
creatio n o f a Ger man state in t heir zone of occu pation, t h e 
Ge cman De moc ratic Republ ic IGDR) . 
Elec t io ns i n t he FRG in Augus t 1949 made the f o rmer mayor of 
Coio gn e , Ko nrad Ade nau e r o f the CDU, the FRG's first chancellor. 
Adenau e r' s pr i mary goal was to develop a close re l ationshi p wit h 
th e West . Th is would serve se ve ral purposes. First, the West 
still re t ained ultimate control over mos t aspects of Ger man 
poli c y , i ncluding foreign re latio ns and trade . 50 Adenauer felt 
t hat the best way to regain Ger man sovereignty was t hro ugh 
c ooperation and integration with the West. His polic y of 
Vo r auslei stungspolitik, which h a d its roots in the 
Erfuellun gspol itik of Rathenau and the Verstaendigungs p olltik o f 
43 Hen r y Ashby Turner jr. 
Have n: Yale Un iv e rsit y Press, 
The Two German i e s Si nce 
1987), 38 . 
1945 . (Ne w 
5vOcc upatio n o ff iciall y ende d and the F RG too k over co nt rol o f 
it s fo ceig n r ela tions, defense, and t rade in May 1955 . 
• 
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Stresemann, was one of co nciliatio n a nd advan~e co nc e ssions. He 
felt that by ma k ine the fRG a tr u s tworthy par t ner, h e would ~et 
WP s t (' r n s up p o n : t' o c h i s o the r ma . i o r f o r I::' ii; n pol i cy go a l , the 
r· e u n i f i ca t ion o f Ge rm any w i th i n L h e b or d e rs o f 1 9 3 r . 
rr·o m this beli e f he developed the s o - called l:-'ol1tik cj ~ r 
Sta ·-' r·ke . This po i icy centered on the be l 1ef that eve!1t11a LL'- tne 
wo r· l ,J b;.:i.Lance of po we r· wo uld sh i ft to t h e West and lead to Uel'man 
•j . 
reuni. fication o n Wester n t e r·ms. · German pol1 cr , accordin g to 
. l.dena u e r, " must be t o help mak e t he West strong e n ough to i n duce 
:.·) 
the Russians to want to co mprom ise" "· Ln t il that time t h e FRG 
mu st ta ke a fi rm, uncompro mi sing line towards r e un i f icatio n . 
Man i fe stati on s of this po licy inc luded the 1954 Hall s tein 
Doctri ne whi c h prohibited re c ognition o f states tha t recogni z ed 
t h e 0DR5J and a r e f usal to recognize the Oder- Neisse line. 
Li t tle roo m was left for the Schaukelpolitik that 
c haracte ri z ed t he S tresemann e r a . First, it interfered wit h 
Ade nauer's policy of i n tegration with the West. Western trust a nd 
co n c essions co uld hardly be e x p ected in the face of a n yt hin g that 
co uld be thought of as a se c ond Rapallo . In addition to u pset t i n g 
51 wolfram F. Ha nrieder & Auton P . Graeme . The Fo r eig n _ Polic_1es 
9_f__West Germany, France, and Britain . (Redwood City, Cali f .: 
Pre n t ice-Hall, 1980), 51. 
52qtd. i n William G . Hyl a nd . "T he Soviet Un i on and Germany", 
In ~es t Germa n Fo reign Poli cy 1949 - 19 79 . Westview Special S tud ies 
in West Eu r opean Politi c s and Society . ed . Wo l fram F . Ha n r1eder· . 
(Boulde r; Westview Press, 1980), 114 . 
$:] The Soviet Un i on was a t first the o nl y exception to th 1. s 
doct r i ne. Late r, the other Ea s t e rn European s ta tes we r e a lso 
exe mpted because t he FRG viewed them as being c oerced 1n o 
r ecog nizin g the UDR . 
• 
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the West , Schaukelpolitik ~~ ould als o s u bver t t.he poli c~· of 
Po l t t i .k < l~ _r S ta e r k ~ . 5 4 F i n a l l y , ( he ::i o v i e t Un i. o n was t o o s t r o n e; 
v i s - c1 - v i s t he FR G . The max i mum t he US SR was w i l l i n ~ t o a c c e p t 1, ;,. s 
a 11 n1r' i.ed bu t ne u t rc1l Ger man y. 
A cl e n ,q u e r was u n w i. l J i n g t o a c c e µ t t h i s be c :HI s e i t w o 1 1 l d h a v P 
pr P ._,. o:.' n t Pd h i. s des j r ed i. n t e ~ r a t i o n w i th the Wes t , and t he 
d cc ·u mpan .vi. n ~ i nc r e a se L ri Ge rma n sove r ei e;nty, as wel l as ma<j e 
Gt:'r· 111.<lnv '- 1.d .n e rab le to Sovie t do mina ti on. 55 Others in Ge rman y 
~ere willi n e; t o see Ger many n e utral if that was a n ece ss a ry step 
fo r reu nifi cat ion . Chief among these was Adenauer's r ival , Kur t 
Sch uma c he r , leade r of t h e Social Demo c rats. Sc humache r feared 
that ,;e r·man membership in a European Defens e Co mmun ity or NATO 
wo id d o nl y s e rve t o strengthen t he separa tion of t he t wo 
Germa ni es . 
I n man y wa y s, Schumac he r was correct . Po l itik d e r S tae r ke 
d irl i n fac t deepen the di vi s ion between the two Germanies . It was 
als o unsu c cessful in producing a n y co nces sions f r o m the Sovie t 
Union . The USS R ha d not weakened as Adenaue r had as sumed it 
wo uld , a nd by 1955, foll owing t he FRG's member s hip i n NATO , t he 
Soviets had developed a two Germani.es policy wh ich called for a 
mainte nance of the statu s quo in Europe . 
Polit ik der Staerke also failed fro m t he pe rs pective of 
West er n s upport f or Ge rman r eunification. Whi le giv i ng Lip 
s e r vic e t o Ge rman reunification, the All i es also had an i nt e r est 
':4 Hanriede r , 51 . 
S'i Griff i th , 44. 
• 
• 
• 
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1n p r e serving the status qu o . The di ~ ision o f Ger man y main tained 
the balance of power, and mo r e o v er, acceptance ot" the s t ::t t. 11s quo 
wo1 lld l e ;:i.d t o r e duced t e n si o ns . Th e failure of the west t o a ct 
d11r i ng the Ber l in uprising of L953 and late r du rin g th e hu1 l d Ln "s 
o f th e Be r ljn Wall in L96 1, as well as F r·a nce's t" e co ~n1t· ion o f 
t he ud e r - ~ei s se line i n 195~ put doubts i n Ad e nauer' s mLnd 01 · the 
We stern co mm itment to Ge rm a n reunifi c ation . 
As Schwartz writes , Adena uer s uf fered fro m a "Potsdam 
co mp l ex" , wh ich was the fear that the Four Al lied Powe r s woul d 
56 r eac h ag r ee me n t s at Ger ma ny' s expense. As mi ght be expected, 
Adenaue r did his best to oppose detente , He pursued a ''hol din g 
po l i cy '' against detente by calling for Western unit y and Ger man 
. f' . . d . . f ' d t 57 l h h h . r e un1 1cat1on as a p re co n 1 t 1on · or et e n e. At oug t 1 s 
worked for aw h i le, public opinion in the West and the des i re of 
the United States fo r arms control agreements s howe d that det e nte 
was mor e i mportant to the West than German reuni fication . 
Thus, Ade nauer had several mo tives in ac c epting t h e 
Se ptember 1955 Soviet invitation to c ome t o Mos c ow t o open 
diplo matic relations. First, he wanted to ga i n mo re influence 
within th ~Pther members of the Western Alliance by developing 
h is own "Russia Card". Although Schwartz notes that eve n t hi s was 
pu r s u ed in close consultation wi th the Wes t 58 because Adenauer 
56 Hans - Peter Schwartz . " Adenauer's Ostpolitik", i n West German 
f~Q r e i ~ n Po l i c y 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 7 9 , 1 3 1. 
il Grif fith 62 . 
Sa Sc hwart z , 131. 
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was anxious to a voi d what c oulJ be co n s trued a s anothe r f r ea t y of 
Ra pallo . 59 I n additio n to this mo t ive, . \denauer a ls o h o pe d t hat 
t h e So \· i e t s 1,; 01 dd b e prepar·ed to make co nce ssi o ns bec ause o f 
d o mest i c prol1lems and the incre a s ing s tra i n in r e la t i o n s wi t h 
Chi n a . Final l y, he hoped to se c llr e t h e r e i e ase o f' t h e r P m:· t t n · n \.'. 
Ge rm a n pri so n e rs of war in t he USSR and u npr-ov e the s1t. u .'lt 1o n 
,~o n ce n1i. n g tile stat us of West Be rlin . E\·en though no pro gress o n 
the t;erman q1 1e stion c ame fro m the s e me e tin~s , diplomati c a nd 
trad e relati o ns wer e established, t,erma n p ri so ne rs wer·e released, 
and c ondit i o ns i n Berlin t e mpo r a ril y i mpro ve d. The g r eat e st 
signif i c anc e to this meeting, however, was t hat for the fi rst 
time si n c e the end of World War II t he Federal Republ ic wa s 
beginning to sow the seeds of an independent poli cy toward s the 
East . 
Th rou g h o ut the late 50s the S PD, FDP, a n d the DP p ushed f o r 
c loser r elations wi t h the s t ates o f Easte rn Europe . The S P D, 
espe c ially hoped to regain German pol itica l influence in th e East 
through increased trade. 60 T i es with the East we r e fu rth e r 
r e newed in 1958 when, under pressur e fro m business and the SPU, 
Adenauer inked a trade package wit h the USSR that includ e d 
p rovisi ons allowing the emigrat io n of ethnic Germans from the 
59 This t reaty with the USSR foll ow ing Ger man me mbershi p in 0iAT tJ 
bea rs more rese mbl ance t o the T rea ty of Berlin that Stresemann 
signed with the Soviets to ease t ension following t h e signi ng of 
the Loca rn o treaties . See Waldemar Besso n. " T he Conflict of 
Traditions : the Histor ica l bas is for West Ger ma n Foreign Poli cy , " 
c h ap. in Br ita in and West Ger ma n y : a nd t h e Future of Forei ~ n 
Pol.ic.Y- , (New Yo rk: Ox f ord Uni ve rsi ty f-'r e ss , 1971) , , -L 
au Dean 2 1. 
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US::iR . 
Po litical forces 1n th e Federa l Republic we re beginn i n g t o 
mi"l Ke 1 r ;-ui i_t; onal c alls for close Ge rm a n eco nom ic a nd pol itical 
t 1ese; with Lhe East . Closer relatio n s, h o we ve r , were lim..1ted bv 
t-t1P Hrti Lc.;t p i_n Doct r i n e a nd th e refiisal of t h e FRG to r ecog ni z e 
the 11cf er -01 f'' isse line . f h e C[ 1U had l i mited room to man e1 1ve[' her·e . 
A Lar·g;e portion o f its c onsti t uency wa s made up of re f ugees f[ ·o m 
t h e l:'~as t . ,\it hough the seeds had b een sow n for a return fo r more 
traditional Ger ma n appr o aches to the Eas t, Adena u e r wou ld not be 
the o n e to bea r the fr uit. 
Ostpolitik 
T he fo reign policies o f Ade nauer's successor, Ludwig Erhard 
(196 3 - 1966) we re a n extensi o n of t he c autious l ook eas t wa r d begun 
b y Adenauer. Trade missions were exchanged wi th Poland, Hungary, 
Bul ga ri_a , and Ro ma n ia . I n 19 64, the FRG s igned a trade agree me n t 
with Yu~oslavia a nd a ls o attempt e d to open trade relations wi th 
Cz echos l ovakia . Ag reements wi t Cz echoslovakia foundered, however, 
because while t he FRG was willing to r eject the Mu nich agreemen t 
o f 193 8 , the FRG was unwill i n g to de c lare it "null and void '', As 
unrl er Adenauer, German p ol icy towards the East was constrained b y 
the limitations imposed by the Hal l stein Doctrine, unwillingness 
to acrept the Oder-Neisse Line, and divisions in the CDU\FDP 
coalit ion . 
The Gra nd Coalit io n formed by the CDU and the SPD i n 196 9 
• 
• 
• 
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soll~ h t to further creat e an " opening to t he East" . 01 Chancellor 
Ki es in~e r and especiall y Fo r eign Minister Wil ly Br a ndt r ecogn i zed 
th A. t Po li ti k _d e r _Staerke had served to l im it Ger man dipl o mati c 
op ti o ns . The Federal Republic had be c o me an eco n o mi c giant wh il e 
rP mA.i njn£\' a politi c al dwa r f . 62 Thus , o n e of t h e fi r st acts by 
t h e Grand Coali t i o n was to ove r look the Ha l Lstei n Doct r i n e b y 
o p e n i n~ d ip lomati c relations with Yugo s lavia a nd Ro mania in L~H7 . 
Howeve r, t he l i mits o f this poli cy were ill us t rated b y the Soviet 
in vasion o f Cz e c hoslovakia in 1968. The i n vasio n s h o we d that the 
Sov ie t Uni on was the main arbiter of p ower in the East a nd that 
o n ly th r o ugh the Soviet Union coul d an answer t o the Ger ma n 
question be found . 63 As it had often been the case over th e 
previo u s two hund r e d y ears, Ger ma n y 's f ate s ee me d tied to its 
Large eastern neighbo r. 
Brandt Era _( 1969 -1 97 4) 
In Octo ber 1969 , Willy Brand t became c hanc ellor of t he FRG 
wh e n the SPD formed a c oali t ion with t he FDP. As fo r eig n mini s t e r 
in the Grand Coali tion, Brandt had spe a rheaded the d r ive fo r 
c loser ties with the East. As Chancellor , Brandt wou ld go e ven 
furthe r towards reestabl ishi ng ties wit h the East that had , 
despi te pro gress under pre vio us g o v ernments, remained lar g e l y 
unimproved since World War II. 
01 Lawrence Whet ton. Germany ' s Ostpol itik: RelaLions Between_ th e 
f~ _deral Republic a nd the Warsaw Pact Cou n t ries , (New York: Oxford 
Uni v e rsi t y Press , 1971), 93 . 
62I bid . 
03 Ibid , 23 . 
• 
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The n e e d f or an end to Pol i~ i~ ~er ~taerke and a new 
O§lpol itik had be e n re cogn ized b y Bra nd t fo r so me ti me. Th e 
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cons 1_r·11cr. Ln n of t h e Bee l i n Wa l l d ur i n g hi s term as ma yo r of West 
Be r l in p r ofo u n d lv af f ecte d h i m. T h e bu il di n ~ of t he Wa l l 
ne 111onst r ;:t t e d t o Br an d t t hat Po lit_i k _d e r S t ae r _ke was un fe a sibl e 
fs Lve n \.o.('S1e t'n di.s in t er·e s t in s o lv 1. ne; the l.~e nnan q ues t 1.o n. To 
BP1n d l. l h e o n l y r e al i stic poli c y wa s o n e of d e tente c ond u c te d 
f r-o m q posi t i o n o f weak n e ss. 64 Ac c ord i ng t o Brandt: 
i•i e co u ld not b e c ome the l a st of the Co ld Warriors, t he 
oppone n ts o f c hange . .. Asso c iated with this was the hope that 
a det e n t e i n East -W e st rel a tions a nd changes in the European 
l a ndsca pe from cooperation might possibly create a new 
fra mewo r k for the solution o f the German question . 65 
Ha nr i e de r ref e rs to t his as a so - c alled policy of 
r e s i gnati o n "designed not so much to bring about changes f o r a 
fo r seeab l e fu ture as not to foreclose possibilitie s for an 
un f o r s e e a ble future" . 66 Brandt was espe c ially conce rned with 
improvi n g the c o nditions of Germans living in the East. 
S u ccessful detente with the East would a lso prov ide busines s wi t h 
ne w o pportunities as economic ties developed, lead to a l ightened 
FRG defense burden, give the FRG more diplomati c f re edo m of 
~-~· ----------
04Te rr e nce Prittie . The Velvet Chancellors : A HistoLY,_of Po s t -
War __ Q~rm a n y . (Lo ndon: Muller, 19 7 9), 10 7 . 
65 will y Brandt. People 
tr a ns late d b y J, Maxwell 
<,' om p a n y , 19 78 ), 167 . 
and Politi c s: The 
Brown.john . (Bost o n: 
Years 1960 -1 9 75. 
Little Brown & 
6t Ha nri e d e r. "West German Foreign Po li c y 1 9 4 9 -1 9 7 9 : Ne ces s i t i e s 
a nd Cho i ces ··, West Ger man Foreign Poli c y 1949-1979, 28 . 
• 
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mo ve ment vis-a- vis the West, and end Wes t e rn co mplaints that 
Germany 's unrelenting cries f o r r e uni fica ti o n were holdi ng up 
ti 7 dete n te . 
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Br a ndt real iz ed that the only way Ostpo l i__t ik. wou Ld be a 
s11 cces s and relati o ns with t he East normalized wo uld be b :v 
accept ing the stat u s quo in Europe . Thus , within hi s fi rs t one 
hund~ed days in office Brandt r ecog niz ed the d e facto exist e nce 
of the GDR , abandoned the Hallstein doctr ine, a nd agreed to 
negotiate an agree ment to recogni z e the sanctity o f th e Oder-
~eisse line. Public opinion now suppor te d this . In 1951, 80% of 
Germans polled said that Germany should not be satisfi ed with the 
68 Oder-Neisse as the German- Polish border. By late 1 969 , 
howeve r, publi c opinion had shifted. Nea rly 75% of those po l l ed 
approve d of official talks with the GDR, while over h a lf fav o r ed 
fo rmal reco gnitio n of the GDR and renunciation of the los t 
Eas t e rn territories. 69 
Brandt's early diplomati c priorities were treaties with Lhe 
Sov iet Union and Poland. In August 197 0 , the FRG si g n ed a non -
aggression treaty with the USSR . The treaty r ej e c t e d the use of 
fo rce and ~ecognized the inviolabilit y of all existing front ie r s . 
"'· 
The agreement served several purposes. First, Brandt us e d 
ra tifica tion of the treaty as a bargaining chip to get the 
67 Roger Morgan . 'The Ostpolitik and West German y 's Externa l 
Relatio ns", in The Ostpolitik a nd Political Change in Ger man y. e d. 
Roger Tilford, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1 975) , 2 1 . 
68 Ashke nas i, 6 2 . 
• 9 ~ Whet ton, 94. 
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Soviets to ag ree to a four po wer t r eaty on West Berli n. The 
agreement also served to re assure other ~aster·n Europea n natio n s . 
At the same t ime t h e agree ment did not shut the door o n the 
eventual re1inifi c ation of Germany . 
B.v DP c e mber of 1970 , a treaty had als o been si~ ned with 
Poland. This a gree ment a lso re cog n ized the in viobiliL.v o f the 
Oder - Neisse . Despite the symbolic impor ta nce of such a 
co ncess ion, it nevertheless r e mai ned only a de facto re co g nition 
of the borde r. I t was pointed out that the FRG c ou ld not 
of f icially re cog ni z e borders that were not its own a nd tha t 
decisions regarding final dispositions of territory had to be 
lef t for a peace treaty. Never t heless, t he wording was 
sufficiently strong to c onvince the Poles to r e establish 
dipl o ma tic re la ti ons a nd co nclude a trade agree ment . Trade a l so 
i ncreased with t he Soviet Union and the FRG became her largest 
Wester n trading partner. 
Intense diplomatic activity tow a rds the East continued . By 
197 3 a mbas sadors had been exchanged with Cz echoslovak ia , Hungary , 
a nd Bulgaria. Turner notes that " By a r e ma rkab le series of 
delicat e and i nterconnected negotitio ns, Bonn had for the f i rst 
ti me assumed a leadership role i n the dipl oma tic sphere". ?O 
Br andt c oncu rs, writing: "We became t he adv o cat e o f o ur o wn 
interests vis -a- vis the governme n ts of Easter n Europe. By doing 
so we s trengthened our v oice inside the bodies devoted to Wes ter· n 
70ru rner, 157 . 
• 
E11rope, Atlantic , a n d international coope rat ion" . 71 
Brandt's Q_~tp_olili\s was in many ways a further return to 
tra ,iiLi o n~l Ge rman easte rn policy . With Ostpolitik the Federal 
Repub li c, as had the German state in the pas t , found a wa y o f 
achieving independe nce vis - a - vis t he West . Ostpolitik also 
e nabled Lhe FRG to redu ce tension s in Ce ntral Europe and be~i n 
r· efo rging tr'aditional political and economic ties. This polic y 
<,.,'01i ld co ntinue to b e actively pursued under Brandt's succe ssor, 
Helmut Sc hmidt. 
Schmidt Era (1974-1982) 
During the 1970s Ostpolitik became closely tied to detente 
48 
• and arms co ntrol. Ostpolitik enabled the FRG to be a force for 
c han ge and a partner alongside the West in pursuit of detente. As 
Coke r asserts , Ostpolitik "liberated Germany from its role as a 
client" a nd enabled her to use her economic power to end her 
subordination to the Western Allies. 72 
• 
By 1975, trade with the Eastern bloc had become 6.4% of the 
FRG's trade. Exports to Poland in 1974 were five times what they 
had bee n in 1971, at DM 2 . 6 b i llion and expor t s to the Soviet 
Union were three times as great rising to DM 4.8 billion by 
1974. 73 Like Brandt, Schmidt was also concerned with the welfare 
of Ger mans outsi de the borders of the FRG. In 1975, the FRG gave 
71 Brandt, 168 . 
72 c hristopher Coker. "At the Birth of a Fourth Reich ? The 
Br i tish REactio n '', The Political Science Quarterly. v . 61, no . 3 
(July - Sept . 1990), 283 . 
73 Morgan, 24. 
• 
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Poland a DM 3 . 1 billion p a y me nt to c ompe n s a te for th e v i c t i ms of 
Na z is m, as well a s a DM 1 b i llio n c r ed i t . In ret1 1r n 1 25 , 000 
eth n ic Ge r ma n s we re to be al l owe d to l e ave Po land . i4 
Th i s ab ili ty th r o u gh Os..t_p_olit..-i k a nd d etent e t o e xe r ci s e 
Ger ma n eco no mi c inf l uence i n p ur s ui t of f o r e i g n po li c y goal s wa s 
h i g h 1 y v rt 1 u e d b y Sc h m id t . " 0 u r t re a t i e s w i t h Mo s c o w , \.J ar s a w , Ea s t 
Be rli n ... h ave g reatl y r ed u c ed the man y r e as o ns ... f or see k i ng and 
beggi n g f or c o n t i nu o u s r e as s ur a n c e ... o ur mar g in o f ma n oe u v re ha s 
b l l d II 75 h l f h • 1 • h • e e n g r ea t ye n ar ge . Te va ue o t 1s po i cy t ot e FRG 1s 
d emo n st rat e d b y the German effor t s to maintain de t ente e ven 
during peri o ds o f East-West tension . Following the c hill in U. S .-
So vi et relations following the Soviet invasion of Afgha n i s tan in 
1 9 79, Bonn p ropo s ed a poli c y of "divisible detente" . This wo u ld 
have a cc epted c onfli c t in the Third World whi l e maintaining 
c oo pera ti o n i n Euro pe . Si milarly, after the imposi t ion o f mart ial 
law i n Po l a nd in 1981, Schmidt, noting the hardship that poor 
East -Wes t rela t ions plac ed on the two German states, e mphas i zed 
" ado pt i ng a prude nt and measured response t hat would main t ain at 
least a minimum of· cordiality". 76 
The pursuit of Ostpolitik and de t ente were essentiall y a 
return to trad itional German diplomacy. The y enabled the FRG to 
cult ivate historic political a nd economic ties. Moreover the y 
? 4Pri ttie 237 . 
7\ td. i n Co ker 283. 
76Anne-M a r i e Burley . "T he On c e and Fut u r e Ge rman Qu e swt io n ", 
Fore ig n Affa i r s . v . 68 (Winter 8 9/90), 71. 
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al s o provided the FRG with mor e politi ca l c lout by making the FRG 
J ess depe ndent on the West . Finally , Ostpoliti k a nd d e t en t e were 
a re tlll · n o t he idea o f Ge rm any a s a b r i d g e to the Ea s t . Sc h mi d t 
writ es : 
For ce ntur i es ... we f unctioned a s a bridge between 
k u ssia ... and Eur ope . .. T h e Bridge mu s t be rest o r ed and made 
strong . Fo r the Ru ssians it has a l way s been d i ffi c ult to 
unde rst a nd the West ; it h as always been di f fi c ult f or t he 
We st to unders tand Russ ia and Russian poli tics - but t he 
Ger ma n s can bri ng about understanding. Th e y have done it 
th r o ughout t he i r history . 77 
so 
'' Schmidt , 23 . 
• 
The Ko hl Government and the Reunification of Germany 
In 1982, Helmut Kohl of the CDU formed a c oa l itio n 
51 
gove rnment wit h the FDP following a v ote of no co nf ide nce against 
Cha nce llor Schmidt. Despite having ma n y ideol ogic al diff e ren c es 
with t h e SPD, Ko hl l e ft thei r eas tern policy la r gely intact. The 
FRG co nt i nued to seek goo d relations wi th t h e East ~nd t o u se its 
e co nom ic influence , especially wit h the GDR, to obtain 
co n c essi ons that would impro v e t h e lives of Ge rma ns outside of 
the Fede ral Republic . 
In contrast to previous SPD governments, h o wever, Kohl began 
to reemphasize German reunification and that postwar boundaries 
• c ould only be permanently established by a peace treaty endin g 
Wo rld War II. Kohl also attached importance to developing a 
German "national identity" in order to combat the "cultural 
• 
pessi mism" that had kept the FRG from pursuing a politi c al role 
1 t . . h 78 equa o its economic strengt . 
The American decision to deploy intermediate range mi ssiles 
1n Europe also helped to trigger a revival of the ide a of Germa n y 
as a "brid g~ o r med iator" between East and West . Ac c ording to 
Hans-Georg -Betz this strengthened the renewed idea of 
Mitteleuropa f o rming among intellectuals of the left and 
right. 79 Both right and left saw Mitteleuropa in terms of a 
so lution to the German Question: the left envisioning a un i f ie d , 
78 Burle y , 72. 
79 Hans Georg-Betz. " Mi tteleuropa 
Identity", The New German Critique . no . 
and Post -Modern Eu rope~n 
50 (Spring/Summer 90 ), 175 \ 
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neutral Germany and the right a n oppo rtun ity for a ret urn to 
Ge rman hegemony ove r Ce ntral Eu rope . 80 
52 
The yea r 1989 was o n e of great change in Eu r ope as Co mmuni st 
go v e rn ments began to c ollapse thro u g h out the East . ·r he situation 
i n the GDR was no exceptio n. The fall of the Berlin Wa ll Ln 
Nove mber s e t c> f f a c hain of eve nt s that in less than a yea r's 
ti me re slt l t ed i n the reunif icatio n of Ge rma n y . The reunifi cat i on 
c r eat e d a state with a population of 78 million, a trillio n 
dol l ar econo my that makes up 35% of the Europea n Co mmuni ty's 
Gross Na tional Product (GNP) 81 , and a trade surplus worth $80 
billion in 1989 . 82 The reappearance of a single German stat e on 
the European stage raised many questions and unc o vered ma ny 
latent co ncern s . The question everyone would like answered is 
wh at will be Ge rman y 's r o le in the new Europe ? 
no . 
BO ibid, 175 - 9 . 
31steve n F . Szabo . " Reun ited German y" , Curre nt History. 
549 ( Nove mber 1990) : 3 88 . 
v . ::JO 
82 Russe l l Watson & other . "The Ne w Su perpower' ' , Ne ws wee k. v . l l j 
( 26 Febr u ary 1990 ): 20 . 
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What is Germany's Role? 
Perhaps t h e f i r s t place to l oo k for an a n s we r to this 
u1 1e~t i o n ts fro m the German s the mselves . ''The f u t u re is a mo r e 
:..: l use Jv k ni. t Europe , with Ge rman y as the f ir-s t a mon~ eq uals , " 
d . 1'.J ,, <. : t a ._ . 1 c; o r . "" e h ' an to l e ad , '' asse r' ts 1.no t h e r·, 
"f''"' r naps in t ime t he U . S . wiil t ak e c a r e of pl a c es l ik e Ce ntr a l 
·\m e r i. c a . and we w i i l hand l e Ea s t e r n Eu ro pe " . 34 
53 
\i atund l y, t h e most f r i ghte n i n g s c enari o for a n y of t h e 
n Ht ion s of Eas t e r n Euro pe is t h e r e turn of a German y i nt e rested 
1n t.er-ritoria l heg e mony. Those t ha t f e ar suc h an eve ntu a l i t y c ite 
Ge rmany ' s lo ng h i story of conquering her . neighbors . Howev e r, as 
Ca r l Sc h o r s ke, Princeton prof e ssor emer i tus of histor y , point s 
o u t: "There i s no European country that hasn't had its momen ts of 
tr y ing to swa llow up its neighbors, and I don't th i nk Ge rm any is 
a n y worse t h a n any other country " . 85 
Those t hat fear an expansion i s t i c Germany also f a il t o 
c onside r t he historical reasons behind Germany's conquests. 
Du r ing t h e nineteenth and earl y t wentieth c enturies addit io nal 
Pxpa nsi on was necessary to guara nt e e a supply of raw mater ials 
and market~ .• Such a guarantee i s no longer necessary t o day . 
Ger many is fully integrated into the world economi c and pol itical 
sys t e m. The global free trade that Bismarck's kle i n d euts c h 
----·-·-----·-·-----
83 w a t s o n, 17 . 
84 I b id . 
85 qtd . b y Ot to Fr i edr ic h. " Germa n y Towa rd Un ity'' , Ti me . v. 1 .3 6 , 
no. 2 ( 9 J u ly 19 90 ): 71. 
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s o lution required to be s u c c essf 1il LS n o w i n p l a c e . ~ti 
Th e re are a 1 so s eve r a l p r a c t i c a 1 r e as o ns why Ge rm an ,, w o u l d 
b e 1rn i_ nL e r e s te d i n territor i al expansi o n. First, as Sz abo point s 
o ut c,e rman v h a s h e co me a t rad i ng s t at e , wh i ch means Lhat to be 
s 11 (': o-..;sf u l s h e mu st be se n sit i•.e to th e \· iews a nd co n c<~ rn 
p;.:i.r·~rwrs . " .--\ st: r on!s e mpha s is o n militar y p ow e r wo uld se l o f [ 
c o 11 n t e r · - a l l i ;;i n c e s a nd co n f r o n t Ge t ' man y o n c e a g a i n w i t h i t s o l d 
p r on i. e m o f en c: ir c l e men t by ho stile powers" d Ge rman e mphasis on 
mi lita r v p ower i s e speciall y unlikely sinc e Germa n y has ag r ee d to 
c 11t the si ze of the Bundeswehr by 23 0,000 men by 1 9 94 . 
Ec o nom ical l y , the price of territorial expansion may also be 
p r ohibitive . T he cos t of reviving the East German economy, 
suppos e dly the mo st modern of Eastern Europe may eventuall y cos t 
upw a rd s of $70 0 billion. In addition, as Stephen Evera as se r ts , 
t o da y ' s post -indus t rial economies which depend on knowled g e - based 
forms o f product ion are not ready made for conquering. The 
sec urity me as ures necessar y for subjugation would restr i c t the 
flow of information to such a degr e e that productivit y would b e 
seri ously limited, · thus canceling out any benefits of 
c onquest. 88 
Many of those who fear a resurgent Ge rman expansion is m a r e 
Poles who live in those areas that were part of the prewar German 
86 Cal l eo, l.64 - 5 . 
87 Szabo , 38 8. 
~
8 Stephen Van Eve ra. "P rimed for Peace in Eu rope After th e 1_·,'.) 1 d 
War", International Security . v . 15 no. 3 (Winter 90/91): 14- 5 . 
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Re i c h . T h ey c i t e Ko h l' s f oo td r a g~ i ng t o s i g: n a t r ea t y re cog n i z ing 
t.h e (irl e r - Nei sse . T h e y a ls o not e Fin a n c e "Jj n i '.::i t e r ' s T h e o wa ige l ' s 
J 11 !" l'18t1 spe e c h, i. n wh i ch h e a i d t hat a r eunifie d Ge r ma n y wo u ld 
ha\·e ct t· i ~ nt t o th e bo r d e rs of 1 9 3 7 . 1~ T h i s s h o ul d n o t b e 
tt 10 11~ht of a s the mai nst r eam o f Ge r ma n p o l i.ti cal th c 1rg: h1 , 
f-' u 1- e \ c r . ha j ge i' s spe ec h wa s a so 11r·c e of mu c h e mbar ra ::; s me n t . 
-\ Ct.,=· r·h·,qr rl s . Fo r e i gn Mi n i s ter Gen sc h e r t h r·eatened t o withd r-ctw the 
i- lJl, r·q m tne CDC/FDl-' co a lit ion i. f t h e L Du so u g ht t o " t urn bac k 
. 1 ' h . " 91) t he wnee ot 1s t o r y . 
Ko h l ' s ea r ly f o otd ragging o n f o r ma l reco gni t i o n of th e Ode r -
~e i s s e c an b e at t r ibu ted t o politi c a l need . The Leag u e of 
Exp e l lee s c la i ms to h av e 2 . 3 mil l i o n me mbe rs and Kohl ' s CD U s t i l l 
depP nd s o n ! h e i r v o te s . T h is is il l us t rated by a J un e 1 990 s p e e ch 
to t: h e ~~ 1 n d e s ta g i n w h i c h Ko h 1 , w h i 1 e s ta t i n g h i s i n te n t i o n t o 
t' o rm a l Ly n ~co g n i ze the Oder- Neisse , spent most of his ti me 
e xp r P ss ing sy mp athy to t h o se Ge rm a n s fr o m the f o rmer e a s te r n 
ter rit o r ies . Ho wever, P e t er Sc hnei d e r a r gu es th a t the mino r i t v 
pr·oble m i s re a l l y a non - i s s u e . Visi t in g Po l a nd he found t ha t all 
of t h e e thnic Ge rma ns he met h a d b ee n v er y P o l o n i z ed a n d wer e 
ll ni. n te re sted i n t er ritori a l rev i sion . Their main co n c ern s were 
that the y be a llowed to s p e ak Ge rm a n and h ave c hurch s ervice s 1 n 
Ge r mRn, r i ght s t hat wer e g u a r a nteed b y a n agr e e men t signe d b y 
Koh l i.n ~ ov e mbe r 1 98 9 . Ba c k in t he West, Sc h n eide r repo r t s t h a t 
-· ·--------- - ---
.~0 "Leb e n s r a u m all Ove r Ag a i n " , Ne wsw e e k . v , 1 1 4 (2 -! Jul .v 1989): 
2 5 . 
· :! I b id . 
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• 
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many f orme r e xp e llees, inc l u ding t he chai r o f the S 1lesian 
Pat ri ot s Cl ub, d espite their c ri es fo r bord er rev i sion . wo u ld not 
re t 1ir n to the East . ~1 T hi s 1s n ot to s a:v that the bord e r a n d 
mi norit i e s i ss ue s mi g ht not be e xploited fo r politi cal purposes . 
J n ~1 a r- ch Kohl e mphas i ze d that th e stat 1J s of Ge rm an mi nor·it1es Ln 
Poland wo u l d play a n importan t role i n neg otia ti o ns fo r a ~o o d -
n e ig-h bo rllnes s treaty , b u t it 1s un li kely that a c tual te rr i t o t'L·--tl 
r e visio n wi ll eve r be a goal. 
Ra ther t han territorial ex p ansion or r e visio n, it is mo r e 
like l y that Ge rman y will pursue her t r a dit i onal efforts to 
econo mi cal l y do minate Eastern Europe . Ac co rd ing to Ander so n and 
Me ye r, Ge rman b usinessmen look to the East as a pot e nti a l "Taiwan 
92 West " because of its pool of skilled, c heap Labor . Wat s on a i so 
points o u t t hat Germa n y ' s locat io n plus the nature of h e r 
ma nufac turing strengths : machinery, industrial systems, 
c hemi c als, a nd c onsumer goods ma kes Germany highl y - su ited t o d o 
bu sine ss in Eas tern Europe . 93 In addi t ion, the stren g th of the 
Ge rman ec onomy makes economic dom i natio n plausible. The Ma r k, 
whi c h foreign exchange exper t Al So r ia ca lls '' the c urrency :,i the 
9 0 s' ', is already the anchor f o r the n i ne -member Eu r ope a n ~ o n e t ~r~ 
Syst em. 94 Da niel Burstein, an analyst o f g lobal business a n d 
11 Pete r Schneider. "Is Anyo n e 
Si lesi a", New York Times Mag azine . 
92 An derso n , 55 . 
;3 
' Watson, 20. 
Ge rman Here : a Journey int o 
( ) : 64 . 
~
4Blanca Rie mer & Jo n athan Kapstein . '' T h e West Ger ma n Mark 'l <l \" 
Soon Ru l e the East " , Bus i ne s s We e k . ( 2 7 Nove mb e r 1989 ) : 65 . 
• 
• 
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f ina nci a l issue s, p r ed ic t s t h at the Bur1desbanK a n d o ther Ge rman 
i nst j t1 1t io n s wil l beco me Eu rope 's 'c e nter o f e c o no mi c 
. " ; 5 grav ~tv . · 
f:.xa mp.ies of gro1-,ing Ger man eco no mi c 1n L i. uencP i.ri the !·:ast 
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ab ,, irnd . Ha l f o f the 700 foreign ve ntu r es i n H1 tng ary :1re liennan 
,u 1d De_ut_s_c;-h_ c; gAn!.5_ hA.s alr e a d y o pene d b ra nch of fi ces Ln Bud ·.lpe-;l 
and Warsa w. Ln ~ove mb e r 1989 , Le c h Wa l esa cleare d his c al e nda r t o 
me et wi t h Ger man bus ine ssmen , c al Ling for an .. i n vas i o n' ' of 
fo r ei.g n i n v e slors . ' 0 T h at same mont h , Kohl we n t t o Wa r s aw with a 
financial aid p a c kag e wort h $ 1. 7 billi o n in n e w c r e di t s i n 
ad d itio n to t he S2 b il l i on al re ad y writ te n off o r r e s c heduled. 
Whi l e p r es e n t e d as a fo rm o f "w a r reparatio n " a n d mo r al 
ob l igat i o n , s kep t i c s s aw t he ai d package as h e ge mony b y a n ot h er 
~ 7 
n a me . 
Ge r ma n fina ncial a id also s eems t o have influe n ce d Hun ga r ian 
fo r eign pol i c y . J ames Hoagland c on t ends t ha t t he Au gus t 198 9 
o pen i. n~ o f the Hu n g arian border wit h Austria, a llowing a ro u te 
f o r Ea s t Ge r ma ns t o escape to t he West , was a dire c t res u l t o f 
pressure from the FRG. Th i s i s be c a u se t he a nno unce me nt of t h e 
de c isi on came at a meeting between Hunga r y ' s pre mi er a n d Ko h l . 
Aid t o Hungary and Hungary's de sire to be c o me a n ass oc ia te me mber 
o f the EC we re a l so discussed at t hi s meeti n g . Two mont hs l a ter 
95
''T h e Awe s o me German Giant '', U. S . Ne ws _§., Wo r l g_~9 r 1 , (1 
April 19 9 1 ): 5 0 . 
96 And e rs o n, 56 . 
97Harr y Anders on. " We hav e a n In te r e st in the East'', .:i_ews~eek. 
v . 114 ( 13 No ve mbe r 1989 ): 5 5-6. 
• 
• 
•• 
the FRG made an unt ied loan t o Hungary a nd agreed to favor 
Hungary's request for EC membership . Hoa~land a lso re po rts that 
Czec hosL c\·a kia took a "hands ofC " policv towards Eas t Ge rm a ns 
f o l lo wj n E ~ n e x c ha n ge of messa~es with the Federal Rep ub lt c . 31 
Thus , as Uerrna n.v rn o\es un ited t u ~,;ard the vea r 2 0 00 the 
1_; P t ·Hi:: t ns :, re as Burlev p 'lt s it ''at the ce nter, eco n o mi c all .v , 
pol.i t 1c allv rtnd c ul t ura lly , and a re determined to press t h e ir 
aJ \· a nta1se·· . ~~ The Ge rman s wi ll co ntinue to play out the i r role 
as "bridge" to the East as the y hav e for a millennium . Some 
things h a v e changed . The days o f c o nqu es t for the sake of 
security and ec ono mic interests a re over. i n Europe . Howeve r , 
Germanv's status as Europe's eco nomic powerho use places her in 
58 
the posi tio n to be an e conomic hegemon . Realization of a Europe an 
eco n o mic union that includes the states of Eastern Europe co u l d 
finally, and peacefull y , fulfill the dream of a German - dominated 
;-.1 i _t t e _l euro pa . It is up to the Ge r m ans to dee ide whether the ir 
r o l e ls a benevolent one or a return to the arrogance and 
haught i ness of pre vious days . 
·lx 
' J a mes Hoagland . "Europe 's Desti n y '', f ore i,__g_n Aff a ir:-~ . -t i). 
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